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The Washington Monthly

Will the Department of Energy Finally Stop Nuking America?

By Peter Gray

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

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The Washington Monthly

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LETTERS

Rite and wrong

As a new subscriber, I have just recently been delighted to see my views on character quoted in the January issue of your distinguished periodical ["Not Just Read and Write, But Right and Wrong," Kathleen Kennedy Townsend]. True, Ms. Townsend distorts my views in a most cruel but highly creative fashion, but then she did spell my name correctly. In this publicity-conscious era, that's all that really matters, right?

Let me fervently assure Ms. Townsend and your faithful readers that I, and people who think as I do, stand foursquare for "truthfulness, temperance, public spirit, and respect for honest labor." The 64 trillion dollar question (Carter inflation, you know) is how to do it? That was the theme Ms. Townsend so blithely ignored: Is character best created by rational inquiry or simple indoctrination?

For instance, I want my own children and my students to turn out to be good, patriotic Americans. Now patriotism, perhaps much to Ms. Townsend's astonishment, is not as simple a matter as many Americans believe. I do not want patriots in the manner of Nixon, North, and Helms, and certainly I don't want them patriotic in the manner of Germans in the Nazi era. And on the other hand, neither do I want them patriotic in the manner of Earl Browder, Paul Robeson, or Abbie Hoffman. I suspect that all the above got their vision of what it is to be patriotic via simple indoctrination rather than reflective inquiry. Rather, I want my students to become patriots in the manner of Socrates, Jefferson, and Sakharov. I would argue they acquired their patriotism through deep, thoughtful, even painful inquiry and reflection.

To further confuse Ms. Townsend, let me close by quoting from the syllabus that every student I have taught in the last quarter-century receives when entering any of my courses. This should amply demonstrate how "valueless" this professor is:

"The truly educated person recognizes some great fundamental moral truths. These are like the North Star in determining our general direction, though it may require long and difficult reflection when we are forced to act on them in the conflict and hurly burly of daily life: Kindness is better than cruelty, honesty is better than mendacity, education is better than ignorance, courage better than cowardice. How these moral truths play themselves out among competing interests and values makes life exciting, difficult, and dangerous. But great moral truths of this nature no truly educated person can ignore with impunity."

ROBERT PRIMACK
Gainesville, Florida

The author replies:

How good to learn that Mr. Primack "wants his children and students to be good, patriotic Americans." So do I. And, happily, our goal is neither so complicated nor so mental as he supposes. Jefferson's work for good citizenship and Sakharov's courage show us that we learn virtue through action and example and not only through reflection.

Money talks

The report ["Tidbits and Outrages," February] concerning the remarks of Houston City Councilman Jim Westmoreland about renaming Houston Intercontinental Airport "Nigger International" has a happy ending. Westmoreland, who had generally been viewed as approachable by the city's minority community before his gaffe, was defeated for reelection. More remarkable, he was defeated by a black political novice, who would have under normal circumstances been fortunate to get a quarter of the vote.

Major civic leaders all spoke out against Westmoreland's remark (while sometimes defending him personally). The most telling argument, however, was that such racism would spoil the business climate in Houston. Certainly one would not want ethnic squabbling to interfere with the accumulation of wealth!

BRYAN JONES
College Station, Texas

What's in a name

I was startled to read the item about the practice of selling mailing lists as practiced by The Eden Press and as castigated by you ["Tilting at Windmills," February].

Due to a single letter error in my name, which has continued to appear to this day, I have been aware that *The Washington Monthly* subscription list is also made available to others. Shame! I will say, however, that you seem selective in deciding who gets to use the list. Fortunately, there are no $3 watches and other such items offered.

Please do not correct this slight error.

FREDERIC P. HILBER
Arcata, California

Postmortem

I am the author of what you characterize as a "bizarre" *Washington Post* story about blacks who believe in a con-

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spiracy theory that the white establishment has intentionally fostered drug abuse in black neighborhoods ["Paternalism by the *Post* or Blackmail by the Blacks?" Scott Shuger, February].

Assailing the piece for "hysteria and groundlessness," Shuger writes: "Not one fact about the conspiracy—not even the name of a single conspirator—is revealed in the story."

This is the kind of cheap shot that is far below *Washington Monthly* standards. The whole point of the article is to explore why blacks from different walks of life are giving credence to a racially charged theory with no apparent factual basis. The fifth paragraph says:

"*There is no concrete evidence* to support the notion that white political leaders have actively perpetuated, or consciously tolerated, the drug scourge in the black community. But the conspiracy theory rings true to some blacks who are convinced there must be an ominous explanation . . . [emphasis added]."

Sure, there was some debate at the *Post* about whether to give prominence to a theory—like "The Plan" for whites to take over the black-run D.C. government—that we personally find far-fetched. It's certainly fair to challenge my interpretation of this sub rosa debate. But to ridicule the piece for not proving the very conspiracy theory we describe as unfounded is the worst kind of intellectual dishonesty.

HOWARD KURTZ
New York, New York

The author replies:

If I gave any offense in describing Howard Kurtz's story as "bizarre," I apologize. It was too inflammatory a word, especially since he has done so much good reporting over the years. It does seem legitimate for newspapers to write about false beliefs that tell us something important about those who believe them. But placement of that kind of story on the front page gives a story objective weight that can, if due care is not taken, easily run at cross purposes to its point. A front-page story in *The Washington Post* under the headline: "WORLD TO END TODAY, SOME PEOPLE SAY," even if it is intended as a study of cultural attitudes, and even if it includes a disclaimer in the fifth paragraph, is bound to suggest imminent disaster to many readers. Avoiding this kind of confusion requires a strong editorial voice in the article that Kurtz's "many say/some say" approach failed to supply. In addition, rather than cite an 18-year-old movie scene, as Kurtz did, for evidence of widespread black acceptance of the theory, why didn't he cite some kind of reasonably scientific research, such as a poll? My original point was that although lapses like these are usually scrupulously avoided by such papers as the *Post*, they often are not when the story is about blacks.

Honoraria Addendum:

Correction: In last month's disclosure of honoraria received by *Monthly* staff members, one from the Southern Conference of Attorneys General was inadvertently omitted. The amount was $1,000.

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Edited by James Blackwell and Barry Blechman

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

A potentially important reform in the compensation of federal employees is gaining momentum in the Bush administration and on Capitol Hill. It could be highly desirable if it improves government salaries in large cities such as New York and Los Angeles, where they are on the whole not competitive with the private sector's. But it will be undesirable if it fails—and I bet it will—to lower federal salaries in the many areas of the country where they are, especially in the middle grades, higher than the local competition. . . .

Another important reform —and this one is clearly laudable—was recently floated by William Seidman, the head of the FDIC, in testimony before the House Banking Committee: Restrict federal deposit insurance to $100,000 per individual instead of per account. The latter method requires us to insure all the deposits of the rich who are smart enough to spread them around in different insured banks and savings and loans in amounts of $100,000. People who have that kind of money don't need federal insurance. They're rich enough to pay for sound investment advice, which makes insurance unnecessary. Deposit insurance should protect the average man, not the big shots. . . .

A few weeks ago, on the front page of *The Washington Post*'s sports section, there was a story by Michael Wilbon headlined "NFL Will Attempt To Shorten Games." There was not one word in the article that even hinted to the reader that the major reason games are longer is the frequent and lengthy time-outs for television commercials.

Shouldn't there be a little blushing at the *Post* about this? How much longer is the sports section going to mindlessly fall for the cons of corporate America in cases such as this and the paper's shameless promotion of cigarette-sponsored sports events? . . .

When I went to New York to go to college in 1946, phones were still very hard to get because of backed-up orders from the war. Besides, a lot of people simply couldn't afford them. So, especially among the young, social contact tended to be phone booth to phone booth. A kind attendant at the cigar store or delicatessen downstairs would take your calls and yell upstairs or push your buzzer and you would run down to the phone, often praying that it was Miss or Mr. Right. The wooden booths of those days afforded privacy and could even be called cozy compared to the facilities available today. Since a phone call was just a nickel, even if the operator was unpleasant enough to demand further payment for another three minutes—and often she mercifully did not—this was a splendid means of communication for those of us who were temporarily or permanently impecunious.

I'm reminded of all this by James Fallows's recent observation in *The New York Review of Books* that he couldn't find a usable phone booth in Manhattan but noticed one sleek automobile after another gliding by as its occupant talked into a cellular phone. The point is, of course, that the world, and most particularly the U.S.A., is increasingly oriented to the convenience of the affluent and the screwing of the rest of us. . . .

Why does the president of New

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York's City Council receive more press coverage than the city's comptroller, who has more important duties? I'm indebted to *Newsday*'s Maurice Carroll for the explanation, which is that the president's office is located just across the hall from Room 9, the City Hall press room, while the comptroller's is located across the street in the Municipal Building. . . .

Among liberal Democrats, the favorite ticket for 1992 is Bill Bradley and Bob Kerry. I'll reserve comment on Kerry, but if you need a good, quick briefing on him, see Jacob Weisberg's article in the December 18 issue of *The New Republic*. About Bradley, I do have this warning to offer: At a crucial moment he was dead wrong on a crucial issue.

The time was the fall of 1987, the place was the Senate Finance Committee, and the subject was the top rate for income taxes. In 1987 it was 38 percent, but it was scheduled to drop to 28 percent in 1988. A majority of the committee, believing that the country would need the additional revenue and comforted by the thought that keeping the rate as it was would not constitute a politically suicidal tax increase, seemed ready to preserve the 38 percent rate. But Bradley made an impassioned plea for the lower rate, arguing he had promised it to rich lobbyists in return for their going along with the elimination of loopholes in Bradley's Tax Reform Act of 1986.

What Bradley did was to take his own honor more seriously than what was right for the country. Suppose FDR had gone before Congress the day after Pearl Harbor and said, "Even though the Japanese have made a dastardly sneak attack that destroyed our fleet, I'm going to turn the other cheek because I promised in the 1940 campaign that I would never send American boys to a foreign war."

If you read the final item in this column last month, you know how important I think an income tax increase is. But it will now require tremendous courage for congressmen to vote for one. It would have been easy to keep the old tax. But we didn't do it because of one man, Bill Bradley. . . .

Have you heard about the Frink letter? Written long ago by Sigmund Freud to one of his patients but only recently discovered, it reveals that the great man was not above giving due regard to the practical considerations of life:

"Your complaint that you cannot grasp your homosexuality implies that you are not yet aware of your fantasy of making me a rich man. If matters turn out all right, let us change this imaginary gift into a real contribution to the Psychoanalytic Funds."

Max Bialystock couldn't have put it any better. . . .

If you wondered whether the tax reforms I recommended last month could raise revenues significantly, I can understand why you did. Over the years the conventional wisdom has come to be that raising taxes on the rich won't raise large amounts of money because there aren't that many rich people.

Well, the conventional wisdom just isn't true any more. Ronald Reagan made the rich so rich that just the increase from 28 to 38 percent tax on incomes above $100,000 would raise an additional $100 billion in the next five years alone. . . .

And before we forget the moral blindness at the *Post* that allows

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That's what "Boss" Tweed demanded when he saw the handwriting on the Hall (Tammany, that is). But the pictures didn't stop. "Boss" Tweed met his maker in the Ludlow Street Jail and Thomas Nast put bitingly eloquent political cartoons squarely and permanently in the middle of American political life. Tweed aside, we think Emerson had it right when he said, *"Caricatures are often the truest history of the times."*

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the sports section to flack for Virginia Slims, you should know that the editors of the *Post* decided it wasn't news when Canada outlawed all forms of cigarette advertising. Such a ban, if enacted in the United States, would, of course, deprive the *Post* of advertising revenue. Is it possible that this had an unconscious effect on the editors' judgment? . . .

Only Norway and Sri Lanka do not permit free television time for their political parties. And only Canada, Japan, and Australia join the United States in allowing paid political advertising on TV. I'm indebted to Max Kampelman, a prominent Washington attorney, for those facts and for his enlistment, in a recent essay in *The New York Times,* in an old *Washington Monthly* campaign to require TV stations, as a condition of their licenses, to give free time to candidates. The licenses these stations receive from the federal government have proved to be licenses to mint money: $26.7 billion in advertising revenues in 1988 alone. They can afford to lose the $200 *million* they would sacrifice in political advertising.

The *Monthly* goes beyond Kampelman in advocating that the free time be used only for debate and speeches by the candidates and not for the manufactured commercials that make the candidate look better and his opponent worse than either really is.

These two steps, abolishing the manufactured commercial and requiring all speeches and debates to be given free time by the stations, would go a long way toward eliminating money as the dominant factor in American politics. . . .

I cannot tell you how depressed I am that the American Jewish Committee has sold out to its wealthy, right-wing backers and canceled its support for the liberal magazine, *Present Tense*, while continuing to subsidize the much more costly but hard-line conservative *Commentary*. Justice for everyone in the Middle East requires expression of liberal Jewish opinion in America to encourage the moderates in Israel.

I should note that I have long been an admirer of Murray Polner, the editor of *Present Tense,* and, incidentally, the author of a book review that appears on page 59. An example of the leadership for which Polner has received far too little credit was his prophetic article in the April 1971 issue of *The Washington Monthly* that for the first time recognized the plight of Vietnam veterans, which would continue to be a national disgrace until their service and suffering finally began to be recognized in the eighties. . . .

I'm indebted to Godfrey Harris of the Harris/Ragan Management Group in Los Angeles for another reform that could revolutionize the system. Harris proposes that all those drawing a salary of more than $50,000 a year from the federal government be required to fill out their own income tax returns and publicly disclose any penalties they have to pay because of errors. This, I assure you, will produce tax simplifications overnight. . . .

Earlier this year I received announcements of the John F. Kennedy Profile in Courage Award and the Cavallo Prize for Moral Courage in Business or Government. I applaud both awards but fear they will find few credible American nominees. Although there have been conspicuous examples of bravery in eastern Europe and China, there is, as you may have noticed, a severe shortage of moral courage in U.S. public life today. I can't

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think of a single recent example of anyone risking his career on behalf of principle and the public interest of the kind that Kennedy wrote about in his book.

Since there *must* be at least a few who, if their stories were known, would provide examples for the rest of society to follow, I urge each of these foundations to establish a second award, this for *articles* about such courage. If reporters are encouraged to ferret out these stories, the heroes involved will receive the recognition they deserve and others will be encouraged to emulate them. . . .

The commentators who ridicule concerns about global warming may be right, but until now, in my 29 years in Washington I had never seen winter end the day after Christmas nor a crocus bloom as early as the first week of February. Many other plants were two weeks to a month ahead of their normal schedule this year. It is also true that there were more brutally hot summers in the eighties than in any of the other six decades of my life. And did you know that Weyerhauser, located in the historically cool and wet Northwest, is developing a drought-resistant tree? . . .

Black men in Harlem are less likely to live to 65 than the males of Bangladesh, according to a recent study in the *New England Journal of Medicine*. If you have ever been in Bangladesh, or its neighboring Indian state of West Bengal, where Calcutta is located, you will realize how grim the *Journal*'s finding is. . . .

In the 1960s my job at the Peace Corps required considerable travel. In those days the aircraft of choice among Third World airlines was the DC-3. This did not exactly inspire confidence on the part of the traveler, who knew that the last DC-3 had been built in the 1940s. Thought of metal fatigue was never far from our minds. How many more take-offs and landings could those wings endure?

Today, airlines are flying some DC-8s and 707s that are more than 30 years old and many 727s, 737s, and 747s that have been around more than 20 years. In 1961, none of those DC-3s was older than that. . . .

State and local government officials tend to imitate the fellows in Washington. For example, in Maryland, the state provides cars and drivers for the governor (who was the only state official to be so honored in my home state of West Virginia from the time I was a boy until I left to come to Washington in 1961), *and* for the lieutenant governor, the attorney general, the state treasurer, the comptroller, the speaker of the House, the president of the Senate, and occasionally, according to *The Washington Post*'s Richard Tapscott, for the governor's "best friend," Hilda Mae Snoops.

The state police, who provide the drivers, like to think of this as a security function. Their model is the Secret Service. As one Maryland legislator observed: "There sure are a lot of those people standing around with things stuck in their ears.". . .

And speaking of official cars, I do not begrudge Douglas Wilder, Virginia's governor, his new Lincoln Town Car, but I do wonder why the state had to pay extra for six-way adjustable power seats. . . .

Veteran readers know that this magazine has long advocated not women's, but men's, liberation. We have wanted men to imitate the best in women, rather than women to imitate the worst in men. That the latter has happened is suggested by this recent report in *The Wall Street Journal*:

"Between 1979 and 1988, the number of women arrested for violent crimes went up 41.5 percent vs. 23.1 percent for men. The trend is even starker among teenagers."

But there is still hope. I may have found a female ally. She is Marija Gimbutas, an archeologist at UCLA, who contends that 6,000 years ago there was a European culture in which neither men nor women dominated the other sex. People delighted in nature, shunned war, and crafted ceramics instead of weapons.

That sounds good to me. Machoism is the enemy, whether in men or women. . . .

—*Charles Peters*



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Blooperfund

That's supposed to be cleanup, not coverup

by Ned Martel

In the field where her sons Fred and Davey used to play baseball with their friends, Marie Flickinger is examining the ground where no grass has grown for 18 years. She has been watching these patches of soil closely and worries about getting too close. She also worries about her fellow residents of South Bend, a neighborhood near Houston. Engineers wearing protective clothing and breathing through respirators have dug up their backyards and bored holes in their garage floors. There were no health threats, the community was assured; the levels of contaminants weren't dangerous. Since then, one of Fred's friends has had a brain tumor removed, and five of seven pregnancies in a two-block area have resulted in miscarriages or birth defects.

For more than three decades, Monsanto, Amoco, and Arco dumped toxic waste at the Brio Refining Site, which abuts South Bend. But that's all in the past. In the last few years, the polluters have owned up to the hazards they created; they have tested the soil to see the extent of the damage, and they have proposed a plan to clean it up. All this seems like substantial progress. So why has the neighborhood's nervousness deteriorated into terror?

Because the real dangers at Brio were hidden by a terrible compromise. The Environmental Protection Agency spoiled its chance for a thorough cleanup by accepting much less from the polluters than it should have. In its negotiations with the companies, the agency based its cleanup plan on the damage they reported. Legally, that's what it's supposed to do. Congress decreed that this assessment should be done by the polluters. But you can imagine how strong the temptation is for the polluter to underreport the contamination when a lower level will buy a cheaper cleanup. And you can imagine the pressure on the EPA's regulator to take what he can get when the polluter is footing the bill. What you can expect from these cheaper cleanups is that they won't clean up much. Then the EPA will have to return to do a more thorough job. The agency's deals with polluters might only postpone government costs rather than spare them. The danger of the situation is familiar to followers of the S&L scandal: overworked regulators buckling under pressure from corner-cutting corporations. But the South Bend residents aren't just risking their life savings; they're risking their lives.

South Bend over

Flickinger, who runs a community newspaper, has joined her neighbors in a battle to force the EPA to recognize the full extent of the contamination. The Brio site is a barren lot dotted with small buildings and clusters of barrels. When the South Bend houses were built in 1981, prospective homeowners were told the adjacent lot was merely an outmoded refining plant. But in fact, the site had long been a dump-

Ned Martel is an intern at The Washington Monthly.

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ing ground for noxious by-products of the refining process. The site's owners scavenged the sludge for anything that could be sold back to the oil companies, leaving the toxic remnants to sit beside a bustling neighborhood.

Enter the EPA, whose job is to identify these sites and rank them with others in the nation. When a populated area like South Bend is situated so near a known toxic dump, the "imminent and substantial" risks to the community make it a Superfund site. That means the EPA does preliminary tests and "scores" the site based on the hazards and their immediate potential harm. Nearly 1,200 Superfund sites have been designated in the program's 10-year history. In its early years, the program's bloated backlog of untreated sites and the haggling over expenses crippled all progress. Quickly and monstrously, Superfund grew out of control.

So in 1986, armed with a congressional mandate, the EPA identified the companies who made the messes, told them what safety levels to attain, and left it to them to decide how they would divide the cost. This "enforcement first" strategy lightened the load substantially for harried EPA regional managers. They no longer needed to manage the cleanups from cradle to grave but only to supervise them loosely.

A brief history of slime

At Brio, a coalition of the polluters who called themselves the Brio Task Force hired a team of engineers to conduct an environmental audit, one that would quantify the site's contamination. The engineers very carefully took samples from areas known to be saturated with toxic sludge. But this polluter-funded engineering left open a very dangerous possibility: The polluter could steer sampling away from areas where the densest concentrations were known to be. For example, if the polluters had dumped toxic tars in a pit six feet deep, the engineers could take samples at one foot and at seven feet below the surface. In the EPA's eyes, the right areas would have been tested, but the results still might not accurately represent the contamination there.

A controversy has erupted over how much of the Brio mess the task force kept from the EPA, and the neighbors have organized to find out. A long list of chemical remnants at Brio called VCls and PNAs are, to Flickinger, a foul "alphabet soup" of toxic waste. Flickinger's newspaper has educated its readers about which chemicals at Brio cause cancer, which cause mutations, and which make your lungs burn. Much of this schooling has come by way of Jim and Sue Slaughter's suit against Monsanto and others on the Brio Task Force. As a civil claim filed against the polluters, the action doesn't directly involve the government. But it does demonstrate how a community has had to circumvent the government agency designed to protect it. The community had to hire its own lawyers to unearth the many misdeeds that EPA supervisors literally left buried.

Late in the trial, Monsanto hauled in six boxes of documents it had earlier claimed not to have. The boxes contained records of pollution in the soil and underground water wells as calculated by REI, an engineering firm hired by Monsanto to test the Brio site. The test statistics show that the polluters reported to the EPA only half the concentration of poisons they found. And the discrepancies aren't just the result of misdirected testing—there seems to be falsification of data. A pit containing dangerous levels of toxic sludge is located only 18 inches from the fence that separates the Brio property from a South Bend family's backyard. Here, engineers found toxins three to six inches from the surface—not at six and one-half feet, as Monsanto had told the EPA. The most outrageous discrepancy involved 111 million pounds of toxic tars that Monsanto reported to have dumped at Brio over the decades. Monsanto's papers showed the total to be closer to 750 million pounds.

"It makes no difference," EPA regional manager Lou Barinka told Flickinger when these new figures surfaced. Felony charges may be brought against Monsanto for lying to the federal government; but Barinka's boss, Sam Becker, the one to whom Monsanto lied, still says the discrepancies were never an issue and aren't now. Becker says that the EPA can't possibly expect the engineers to have sampled all the soil and determined how severe the contamination was at each level for the entire Brio site. That's certainly true. But the EPA should expect to see the correct figures from all the samples engineers did take as well as from Monsanto's history of toxic dumping. EPA Administrator William Reilly should have been ashamed of his salute to Monsanto the same week the fudged data became known. In a speech to the Natural Resources Defense Council, Reilly lauded environmentally minded corporations. He recognized Monsanto's efforts "to reduce by a very large percentage certain kinds of waste products."

The South Bend community is seething over the polluters' duplicity—EPA supervisors should be mad, too. EPA officers seem not to have noticed how they were manipulated by Monsanto.

When the cleanup digging begins, fumes from the toxic sludge will waft into the backyards of Brio. The contaminated soil could be churned up for as many as 30 years before the site is clean. Had the EPA known the total pounds Monsanto dumped, it could have taken precautions—such as putting up a plastic

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bubble to trap the toxic vapors shovels release into the air. The agency also might have been more insistent on the polluters' using more permanent means to rid the area of pollution.

The trial prompted more anxiety over the mysterious bald patches in the neighborhood, the ones tested and deemed safe. A former Brio employee testified that he witnessed the spraying of waste where houses now stand. A soil scientist who reviewed the site testified that toxins seeping into the underground water wells have traveled beyond the boundaries of the Brio site. The poisoned streams now run under many of the 600 South Bend homes and are heading toward Houston's water supply.

Marie Flickinger's staff is going door to door collecting the health records of South Bend residents and former residents. With only 25 percent of the homes polled, already there are a staggering number of cases of leukemia in small children, as well as rare forms of cancer in young adults. Cheryl Findley, another South Bend housewife and mother, has taken on the grim task of compiling what the pollers found: Out of 130 homes surveyed, there were 13 cases of birth defects and 8 of cancer, including one of only 11 non-Hodgkins lymphoma cases in the country, and cervical and testicular cancer patients younger than the national average. Children have proven particularly vulnerable: Many are growing at slower rates and learning at slower speeds; some must breathe with the assistance of machines. These 130 homes represent only about 550 of the 3,200 residents and former residents Findley expects to contact. Flickinger worries about other communities near Superfund sites who have put faith in the EPA's ability to protect them. "We're having to protect ourselves from the EPA. We were naive, and it's taken us three years to realize it."

Toxic shocks

Environmentalists and community activists are preparing a barrage of complaints for 1991, the year Congress must vote to keep Superfund alive. Each month has brought a new report, including one by the offices of Senators Frank Lautenberg and David Durenburger and another by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) that demonstrates how lenient the EPA has become with polluters. Most reports document the tougher standards the EPA holds itself to when it can find no responsible party to negotiate with—ironically, its leniency in cleanup standards kicks in only when the polluter is paying. Some sites from Dr. Joel Hirschhorn's years of investigation for the OTA show just how soft the EPA's "enforcers" are on self-policing polluters:

- The Gould site in Oregon housed dangerous levels of lead from decaying batteries. The law insists that this type of pollution must be dug up and recycled. But the EPA didn't press for this in negotiations with the polluters, even though when it was paying for the cleanup it had once said the same amount of lead "represents a health threat."
- The Coshocton landfill in Ohio was brimming with various hazardous solvents and resins. The EPA allowed the polluters to use a "capping" method, in which the surface contaminations are topped with layers of soil and concrete. This means waste might still continue to spread downward and perhaps reach underground streams—as has happened at Brio. In addition, the EPA allowed the polluters a privilege similar to the one they allowed at Brio: It's the polluter who monitors the groundwater.
- The Big Three automakers, among others, dumped deadly PCBs and dioxins at the Rose Township site in Michigan. The EPA sought incineration of the 50,000 pounds of contaminated soil. But after negotiations with the polluters, the agency approved a plan to merely blast the top layers of soil with water jets instead, even though soil-flushing generally just erodes the layer it seeks to cleanse.
- Broderick Wood Products Co. dumped toxic tars and oils on its Colorado property. The EPA has enforced an incineration plan in this case, but it still has pulled a major punch: EPA instructions call for burning oils and tars on the surface along with only the "visible" contaminants found underneath. The invisible—but no less dangerous—toxins that are dug up will be stockpiled on-site indefinitely.

While the EPA should encourage polluters to develop less expensive cleanup technology, it can't afford to let them practice on Superfund sites when a cheaper method's effectiveness is unproven. Health threats at a site should be considered before costs.

EPA whistleblower Hugh Kaufman, one of the authors of Superfund, said too many cleanup compromises look good—and inexpensive—on paper but quickly prove ineffective. He described the Vertac dump in Jacksonville, Arkansas, where daily watering on the site was meant to prevent wind-blown toxic dust from settling off-site. But the cleanup engineers weren't bothering with this, not even on sunny, gusty days. Kaufman said that such laziness is widespread; cheaper, less stringent protection is no more than "linguistic detoxification" that deteriorates into no protection at all.

In 1986 Congress empowered the EPA to go after polluters and make them pay. But the agency doesn't flex that statutory muscle as much as it could. With the legislation came tough deadlines to speed what had been a glacial pace in past cleanup efforts. Under

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the Bush administration, the "enforcement first" strategy trumpeted by Reilly has succeeded at the negotiating table in producing signed settlements with polluters. But less-than-clean cleanups are not what the EPA should bargain for.

The EPA's willingness to negotiate comes from a reluctance to spend government money. With tough deadlines looming, Superfund is too strapped for cash to pay for all the assessments on the nation's immense caseload of hazardous waste sites. But according to OTA, when the EPA must hire its own engineers to check the tests polluters conduct, the agency often squanders almost as much as if it had paid for the tests itself.

If polluters initially refuse to pay for the messes they made, then the EPA must pay for the entire cleanup out of its own pocket. But Congress included a tough clause in its legislation to make sure the EPA would get back any money it doles out—and then some. The agency can call on the Justice Department to clamp down on polluters and demand triple damages and a $20,000 per day penalty for delay. And EPA can hold *each* polluter at a Superfund site liable for the total cost of the cleanup.

The department of a fence

These are hefty weapons, but the General Accounting Office says the agency hasn't pointed them at the obvious targets. Apparently, the EPA would just as soon not get into messy legal squabbles, in which it might have trouble justifying the overly technical point scale it uses to rank the 1,200 top-priority hazardous waste sites. Polluters' lawyers would expose permissiveness in the hazy "imminent and substantial endangerment" standards by which EPA ranks a site. After all, how imminent can the problem be, lawyers could argue, given the agency's years of delay in responding? And such legal battles take time—time the EPA complains it just doesn't

The Worst City Government

In Buffalo, New York, locals don't have to go to the park; the Parks Department comes to them—provided that they're on Parks Commissioner Robert Delano's special list, that is. This winter, a *Buffalo News* investigation discovered that instead of maintaining the city's parks and playgrounds, Parks Department employees often were dispatched to work on private jobs—including a home improvement spree at Delano's own address. Neighbors testified that over a two-year period, park workers installed the commissioner's fences, paved a driveway, sodded the lawn, sided his house, and converted his garage into a family room. "We thought the Delanos won the lottery," said the man next door.

But Delano didn't reserve departmental services solely for himself. Unmarked Parks Department trucks were also sent to local businesses and the homes of other city officials. At a private riding academy, city workers repaired corrals, cut the grass, and removed trees. And to help out a local nightclub, city workers paved driveways, installed signs, and planted shrubbery—foliage provided gratis by the city. Other important Parks Department functions included the annual overhaul of the lawnmower and fishing boat motor of Buffalo's mayor—not to mention those of 100 other private citizens.

No wonder the city auditor has tagged Parks "the worst-managed and operated department in city government," noting that department officials frequently forgot to collect on their bills or put their contracts in writing.

—*Katherine Boo*

When the District of Columbia recently proposed a 20 percent increase in the school budget, there was considerable grumbling and confusion about how the city would raise the additional revenues to pay for it. But all that was probably unnecessary. For the second time in as many years, the D.C. Board of Education has overestimated the number of city students, this time by nearly 8,000. Administrators knew of the discrepancy months before the initial budget hearing, but said nothing. The inflated figures are probably the result of principals deliberately padding the estimates to get larger budgets for their schools. While one may sympathize with their position, as council member Betty Ann Kane puts it, "A school system that can't count, can't teach kids to count."

And speaking of deliberate padding, the chairmanship of the D.C. Retirement Board was meant to be a part-time job, but in the past two years chairman (and Barry appointee) Theresa Watson took 26 trips costing a total of $17,000 and was paid over $90,000, more than three times what her predecessor earned. All this while the District is up against nearly $5 billion in unfunded future pension costs.

—*Daniel Kaufman*

The *Monthly* depends on its readers to keep track of the breakdown of big-city government. Please send your nominations to:

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have. Last summer, EPA senior administrators lamented the conflict between "the expectation of prompt cleanup" and "the need for full and responsive public participation in the cleanup process." They can't deliver both, they've decided.

In its rush to settle, the EPA has lost the crucial skepticism needed to keep the polluters' cost-cutting strategies in check. And the polluters have made a break for the holes in the EPA's enforcement strategy. At a seminar for hazardous materials managers last November, "Corporate Strategist" John Ronan spelled out to polluters that when you hire engineers to do the testing, you "control the site assessment." The agency admits in its 90-day Superfund management review that it's up against polluters who "try to economize and propose only the most minimal remedial selection." The point is that EPA needn't accept the minimum; it should require the maximum.

The agency considers it a real victory merely to have begun these cleanups as quickly as was ordered. But why set weak precedents when the EPA has such a strong statutory deterrent to scare the polluters into action? If the EPA won one resounding legal battle and collected big penalties, wouldn't that make other polluters snap to attention when they are pegged for cleaning up other sites?

The legal track is risky and slow, but right now it's the only honest and firm option for the EPA. The agency should stand firm against these shortcut strategies, not only because it legally can but because it has to. If these cleanups are anything but complete, the threats will return. Then, the EPA's hurried and lenient settlements will have blown the one chance it had to get the polluters to pay. The sweep-it-under-the-rug mentality has become increasingly institutionalized, with the result that in many communities the only thing separating families from a contaminated lot is a chain link fence.

The EPA has set itself up for a mess very much like that of the troubled Federal Home Loan Bank Board, which struggled to keep up with high-rolling savings and loans. The engineers who test sites—many of whom are inexperienced—are effectively controlled by the polluters who hire them. Chances are that the polluters are polluting elsewhere and will want to rehire the engineers who have helped them minimize their costs in the past. Chances also are good that the EPA, under pressure to settle, will continue to accept what it can get. As it is, the engineers testing for toxins fear losing a big client if they report all that they find—just like the accountants reviewing overspeculated S&L deals. The young EPA regional overseers who review tests must put too much faith in what engineers say they've found. Many times, the engineers were once EPA regional overseers themselves, and tend to exercise a territorial seniority over the new project managers. Many times, underpaid, overworked regional overseers will later come looking for jobs in the same engineering firms—just like the S&L regulators and accountants who jumped ship to the businesses they monitored.

Con Brio

The strains on the regional regulators led originally to the logic of polluters assuming cleanup responsibility. But when the polluter is given so much responsibility, it's as if the warden has handed a convict the cell-block keys. Superfund enforcement official Lew Crampton has made the unfortunate comparison between Superfund and supertankers. He suggests both are perilously difficult to steer. The danger for the public is compounded when there are captains of industry like Monsanto at the helm. When Monsanto negotiated the Brio cleanup with the EPA, it was evident just where the company wanted to steer the agency.

One experimental cleanup method, biotreatment, has been advertised as a "permanent" solution. This claim came from ENSR, a consulting firm for polluters, and Celgene, a biotech company, who have teamed up to market this new method. The plan uses microorganisms "to convert hazardous organic contaminants into harmless, nontoxic materials." The polluters selected this plan to clean up some of the mess at the Brio site, even though no test has ever demonstrated that it would destroy all the site's contaminants as effectively as incineration would.

Why biotreatment was recommended is as clear as the names signing the assessment: ENSR used to be REI, the company who took the original Brio soil samples. American Hoechst, one of the Brio site polluters, owns Celgene, whose CEO is the former chairman of—surprise—Monsanto. Weston, the engineering firm that the EPA hired to oversee the tests, has a big client at other sites whose business it wouldn't want to lose. That client? Monsanto.

Unless this framework is changed fundamentally, the conflicts of interest and cost-cutting tactics will continue to undermine Superfund's goal of effective and permanent cleanup. The EPA cannot oversee the polluter-funded testing with 100 percent certainty that the test results reflect all the risks that exist. Since its goals depend on that assurance, it will have to hire the engineers itself. The agency's enforcement staff will have to get tough with griping polluters and collect money up front to fund the testing. OTA has pointed out that an entire research and development wing might be added to verify new cleanup technology and to tailor appropriate cleanups to specific

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
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messes. Without streamlining Superfund, the newly promoted EPA could become the instantly crippled Department of the Environment.

The pressure on the EPA is coming from both sides, the polluters and the communities. But the EPA can extract itself from this squeeze and not alienate either party. Innovative cleanups should be considered, implemented, and refined so that they'll be more effective and less expensive for future sites. Still, where people's lives are at stake, the EPA must guarantee that cleanups will be as effective as possible no matter how great the pressures of time and money.

The economic climate is good for businesses that want to reverse the planet's decay. But before cleanup plans can be "marketed" to the world economy, the government must define clearly and firmly how clean it expects the land to be. George Bush is in a position to usher in these new priorities and to provide new corporate incentives for cleaning up the world. So far, his record is not promising; witness his proposed Clean Air Act, which could allow plants posing the greatest cancer risks to be exempted from shutdowns.

Next summer at a summit in Houston, Bush will welcome the world's economic leaders to discuss, among other things, new strategies for the environment. Just two miles from Ellington Airfield, where the heads of state will arrive, lies the Brio site—a lesson for them all. □

THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY Journalism Award

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Scott Jaschik

The Chronicle of Higher Education

Although Georgetown University's Central American Scholarship Program (CASP)—which brings poor Central American students to U.S. community colleges—is supposed to improve international understanding, Jaschik's reporting shows that the millions in government funds CASP has received since its inception in 1985 ($20 million this year alone) have gone mostly towards ineffectual academics wrapped up in political pork. Georgetown's administration of the program has been lackluster: Offerings have included placement of students from Belize—an English-speaking country—in beginning English classes, and agriculture classes focused on crops that cannot be grown in Central America and that must be cultivated with the use of equipment you cannot buy there. Jaschik reveals that an outside review panel from the Agency for International Development (AID) determined that the community colleges affiliated with CASP were selected "not on their potential in offering courses, but the political pull of the congressmen in the district." Of the 42 community colleges in the program, six are in Wisconsin, home state of Sen. Robert Kasten, who initially proposed CASP, and who has championed funding increases for it every year of its existence. Jaschik quotes Charles Green, the head of the AID review team, as saying, "Any time there has been any problem with this program, Georgetown is on the phone to Sen. Kasten's office, and then Sen. Kasten calls up the head of AID and raises hell."

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The award for stories published or aired in February will be announced in the May issue. Nominations for stories published or aired in March will close April 15. The winner will be announced in the June issue.

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Dealing with the Devil

Why is the U.S. helping the worst killers since Hitler?

by Peter Grier

On April 11, 1975, the chief of the United States mission in Beijing, George Bush, asked a storied prince to return to his homeland.

The exile was Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, a small man given to nervous giggles and strangely effective political theatrics. Placed in power by the French in 1941, Sihanouk ruled Cambodia with vigor and inconsistency before being ousted by right-wing legislators in 1970.

Now he was living in a Beijing mansion and filling his time with cooking experiments. In Cambodia, the government of his replacement, General Lon Nol, was tottering as the fighters of the leftist Khmer Rouge battered their way towards Phnom Penh. Bush, through a French diplomat, offered to fly Sihanouk back to his capital if he would agree to once again become head of state. The United States felt that Sihanouk, a nationalist figure still beloved by peasants, was the only one who could head off a Khmer Rouge victory.

For Sihanouk it must have been a moment of supreme irony. His relations with the U.S. had often been poor, and U.S. officials had given tacit support to the rebels who had toppled him. Furthermore, he was in China as the nominal representative of the Khmer Rouge guerrillas, though in fact he detested and feared them and was as much prisoner as emissary.

But the American change of heart had been too long delayed. By the morning of April 12, the Khmer Rouge were in the Phnom Penh suburbs, and no one could guarantee Sihanouk's safety if he returned. He turned down the U.S. offer. "It was just too late," Sihanouk later told an interviewer.

Zealpolitik

Today the former U.S. chief of mission is president. Sihanouk is still in exile. The murderous Khmer Rouge, having triumphed and fallen, are once again fighting their way towards Phnom Penh. And once again the United States may act too late to stop them.

The Cambodian killing fields, the emptying of the cities, the mindless xenophobia—all that may yet return. If it does, the United States will bear heavy responsibility for the tragedy. State Department officials say they don't want the Khmer Rouge back in power. But in one of those strange twists that gives geopolitics a bad name, the United States is for all practical purposes a Khmer Rouge ally.

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Why a nice country like America got on the same side of the table with the worst killers since the Nazis is a complicated story. But the fundamental reason is that America's long-standing fascination with China was transformed by Henry Kissinger's realpolitik into a religion, one which leads its many zealots to bend over backward, in the face of all kinds of contravening developments, just to be China's friend. Kissinger's decision to play the China card against the Soviets was in its day brilliant, establishing a rapprochement with a country showing some domestic promise while giving much pause to a menacing Soviet Union. But in the last decade the United States has frequently found itself blindly doing things for China that not only make no strategic sense but are also morally disastrous. Under the guidance of would-be China hand George Bush, this past year the fixation became particularly absurd and embarrassing: What was the point after Tiananmen Square and the triumph of glasnost? Nowadays China doesn't even amount to a glimmer of a reason for supporting the Khmer Rouge. At last, after years of moral complexity in the Far East, the United States has found a place where it can remove all ambiguity from its actions: In Cambodia we are doing a bad thing for a bad reason.

In July 1988, a senior administration official was asked what measures the United States had in mind to keep Pol Pot from returning to power. "This is not anything that we have carefully worked out, by any means, or thought about to the degree, or extent of what is possible," he said.

Playing the China card in Cambodia fits beautifully with what might be called the Metternich Fallacy—the belief that morality plays only a bit part in foreign policy and that it's the country with the most ingenious schemes that wins.

The current flurry of international diplomatic activity over Cambodia may yet produce some sort of workable, UN-sponsored peace plan. More likely it won't, and fighting will continue in a nation already as traumatized as any on earth.

Admittedly the situation in Cambodia is far from simple. The Khmer nation has long served as a regional Belgium, a battleground for larger neighbors who don't want to fight on their own territory. For those who have preferred to ignore Indochina since the Vietnam war, here is a quick glossary of the players and their positions:

KHMER ROUGE. Still the unspeakable thugs they used to be, still apparently headed by the notorious Pol Pot and his henchmen, the Khmer Rouge are the strongest faction in the tripartite force fighting the incumbent Cambodian government.

CHINA. Main patron, banker, and armorer of the Khmer Rouge, China is motivated by a desire to inflict as much pain as possible on a nation it views as an ungrateful upstart and regional rival, Vietnam.

PRINCE SIHANOUK. Head of one of two noncommunist resistance factions, and main political spokesman for the tripartite resistance, Sihanouk is continuing his uneasy association with the Khmer Rouge, who are probably responsible for the death of at least 15 of his relatives.

UNITED STATES. Provider of aid for Sihanouk and his fellow noncommunist leader Son Sann, the U.S. hopes the Khmer Rouge role in the resistance somehow will disappear or be contained by Sihanouk political magic.

HUN SEN. Prime minister of the current Cambodian government, which was installed by the Vietnamese after they conquered Cambodia in 1979; a former Khmer Rouge commander who defected to Vietnam in 1977.

VIETNAM. Having invaded Cambodia in the wake of brutal Khmer Rouge border raids, Vietnam has apparently now withdrawn its occupying forces but continues to provide arms and aid to Hun Sen.

USSR. Once Vietnam's main backer, the Soviet Union may well have pushed for the Vietnamese troop withdrawal.

American officials have no illusions about the Khmer Rouge. They say they don't want them back in Phnom Penh. But the U.S. policy is a strange one of quasi-alliance with a group that is officially an anathema. The United States strongly backs Sihanouk and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), both of whom consider the Khmer

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Rouge a military tool and a bad guy who is easier to deal with if he's on your side. The Khmer Rouge have an estimated 30-40,000 fighters, far more than the other resistance factions. Sihanouk calls siding with them a "terrible choice" he is obliged to take.

"We can't disagree with Sihanouk," says a State Department official. "Maybe there are other solutions, but we haven't found any."

The vision held in Foggy Bottom and ASEAN embassies goes like this: We'll be able to defang the Khmer Rouge with a comprehensive political solution. Either through a direct agreement between the resistance coalition and the Hun Sen government or under UN auspices, all the different political factions in Cambodia will agree to free elections. Military units will move to quarantine zones in the country and voluntarily give up their arms. The Khmer Rouge will get .01 percent of the vote in an election, providing their main backer, China, a face-saving excuse to drop them. With no money, no support, and no bullets, the last of the Khmer Rouge will live out their days as guerrillas, easily handled by Sihanouk or whatever democrat wins the vote.

Playing the China card in Cambodia fits beautifully with what might be called the Metternich Fallacy—the belief that morality plays only a bit part in foreign policy and that it's the country with the most ingenious schemes that wins.

Khmer Rouge leaders have indicated their willingness to go along with parts of this political vision. At last year's Paris peace talks, to everyone's astonishment, the Khmer Rouge said OK to quarantine zones.

But do we really believe this? Abiding by the ballot box? Voluntary disarmament? This is the Khmer Rouge, not the Boy Scouts of America. This is one of the most inexplicable horrors of modern times, a guerrilla group from Stephen King. In the three-and-a-half-year period they ruled Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge killed more than a million people through execution, starvation, and overwork. They took the country back to a proclaimed "Year Zero" and made grass grow in the streets of Phnom Penh.

If the Khmer Rouge are to be kept from ever again seizing Cambodia, they will have to be defeated in war. The only questions are: When do you fight them, and who does the fighting? If you wait too long, it could be just like 1975—too late to stop them.

"If the Khmer Rouge take over, we'll share complicity," says Jeremy Stone, son of I.F. Stone, president of the Federation of American Scientists and a fierce critic of U.S. Cambodia policy.

Tanks again

Three problems combined with the overarching China fixation to dog the U.S. policy towards post-war Cambodia from the outset: overemphasis on superpower involvement, too much Washington intramural politics, and a considerable desire for revenge against Vietnam.

When Vietnamese Soviet-built tanks rolled into Cambodia on Christmas Day 1978, the invasion could have been seen as a nationalist struggle best avoided by the United States. Some high U.S. officials—notably, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and his assistant secretary for East Asia, Richard Holbrooke—thought exactly that.

Cambodia and Vietnam, after all, had been vacillating between uneasy cooperation and war for centuries. Enmity was deep-rooted, particularly on the part of Cambodians, who had seen much of their territory gradually swallowed up in greater Vietnam. In his excellent history of 1970s Indochina, former *Far East Economic Review* correspondent Nayan Chanda tells a story he heard countless times in Khmer Rouge Cambodia, involving three Khmer forced laborers in 1820 who were punished by their Vietnamese overlord for not working hard enough. "The Vietnamese buried the hapless Khmers to their necks, so the story runs, and used their heads to support a kettle for boiling water," writes Chanda.

But Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski saw the new Indochina war as a black-and-white struggle between superpower proxies. In his view, Vietnam was a client state urged on by the Soviets in an effort to make a strategic thrust against the Chinese, Cambodia's ally. True, the Khmer Rouge were somewhat distasteful and hard to paint as aggrieved innocents. But it seemed that siding with a two-bit regional villain was surely defensible if it meant standing nobly against Soviet expansionism.

In his memoir, *Power and Principle*, Brzezinski

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writes that in a January 1979 letter President Carter "reminded Moscow of its special responsibility for Hanoi's action and stressed that continued Vietnamese aggression could lead to serious problems for the USSR. These warnings went unheeded." And what might those threatened "serious problems" be? Mostly one—a united U.S.-Sino front. Brzezinski cautioned the Soviets that "their actions might have some impact on the nature of the American-Chinese relationship." In other words, get your friend to leave Cambodia to its genocidal maniac rulers or we'll tip the global geostrategic balance against you.

Besides anti-Soviet sentiment, the other main reason for taking this line was that, above all else, U.S. Far Eastern policy had become obsessed with keeping China happy. And the Chinese wanted the United States to support the Khmer Rouge. China saw the new Indochina war as a Soviet-backed move against their own region of influence. During his visit to Washington in January 1979, Deng Xiaoping spoke ominously of teaching Vietnam a lesson, foreshadowing the punitive Chinese attack against Vietnam that was to follow shortly thereafter. One major lesson of this move was that outmoded Chinese tactics were little match for a battle-hardened army, but that didn't stop Brzezinski from admiring Deng's style in his memoirs. In words that subsequent events have given more meaning than he intended, Brzezinski wrote that "I secretly wished that Deng's appreciation of the uses of power would . . . rub off on some of the key U.S. decision makers."

Milquetoast on China, the United States was anything but when it came to Vietnam. A trade embargo had been placed on Vietnam after the fall of Saigon, and the American public and Congress had no interest in extending a hand to a nation that had so recently bested them on the battlefield. Brzezinski considered relations with Vietnam a minor issue—one that threatened better ties with China.

So he scuttled the State Department vision of balanced openings to China and Vietnam in favor of the tilt to Beijing. The illogical outcome of this approach, as applied to Cambodia, became apparent in late 1979. By then the Khmer Rouge were reduced to desperate guerrillas, and Vietnam firmly controlled the Cambodian nation. But the United Nations Credential Committee voted 6-to-3 to let the Pol Pot regime keep its UN seat. The United States voted with the majority. Even though President Carter, human rights advocate, had called the Khmer Rouge the "greatest violator of human rights" in the world, his administration voted to give them international recognition. Similar votes transpired in subsequent years.

This policy rolled along unchanged through the early, fiercely anticommunist years of the Reagan administration. With domestic tax and budget cuts high on the Reagan agenda, Nicaragua was the only non-Soviet foreign issue that got much attention in the White House.

In 1982 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger swung through the region and took the opportunity to reiterate U.S. coldness to Vietnam as long as Cambodia was occupied. "We will not reward Vietnamese aggression of any kind," he said. At the same time, there was still reluctance on the part of the State Department to be drawn into a greater role in the Cambodian conflict. In 1985, then-Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs Paul Wolfowitz was testifying before Congress that military aid for the noncommunist rebel factions was a bad idea, and that the U.S. wouldn't even indirectly aid the Khmer Rouge.

But that same year a new Washington intramural battle over Cambodia broke out. This one wasn't between executive branch factions. It began in Congress, with Rep. Stephen Solarz as its instigator, and it ended by opening a pipeline of U.S. aid for the Khmer Rouge.

The Solarz system

Foreign affairs is not traditionally popular on Capitol Hill, due to its inherent lack of vote-getting potential. Legislators who take to it always face the danger of the "Chuck Percy Syndrome," after the former GOP senator from Illinois who was defeated partly because voters thought he was spending too much time hobnobbing with foreign dignitaries and not enough time in Alton or Chicago.

In this climate of low interest, Solarz has risen easily to power. He's smart, energetic, and meddlesome—reportedly, during last December's Philippine coup attempt he requested an Air Force plane so he could fly to Manila to criticize administration actions on site.

On Capitol Hill he is widely considered Mr. Asia, even by those who wish it weren't so. In 1985, Solarz decided that the logical end of the U.S. approach to Cambodia could be the horror of the return to power of the Khmer Rouge. His solution: Arm the noncommunist factions of the tripartite resistance. Even though the administration hadn't requested it, Solarz pushed for $5 million in aid to the fighters of Prince Sihanouk and Son Senn.

Ultimately the aid package passed by a large margin. In the House, the feeling among some members was that the Democrats needed an opportunity to look tough in the context of their opposition to arming the Nicaraguan contras and Ronald Reagan's continuing diatribes about the evil empire. Rep. Jim

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Leach, a moderate Republican and ranking minority member on Solarz's subcommittee, opposed the aid. "I have a sense that this committee is trying to make a mark on this town, that we're going to be more anticommunist than Ronald Reagan. That is tough competition," he said at the time.

Between 1985 and 1988, Congress voted $5 million a year in aid to the resistance. Largely due to Leach's efforts, the money was supposed to be for "nonlethal" aid—bandages and food as opposed to bullets. But as the experience with the Nicaraguan contras shows, the concept of "nonlethal" aid is a convenient fiction. Every dollar not spent on food is one freed up for AK-47s.

In 1989 the issue of forthright lethal aid arose: The White House went to the Senate and House Intelligence Committees with a request for covert funds to arm the Sihanoukist factions. With strong White House backing—including Dan Quayle's presence in the Senate chamber in case his tie-breaking vote was needed—the concept of lethal aid for Cambodia was approved by both the House and Senate last July.

Stooge of the Rouge

Ignited by an obsession with China and superpower politics, fueled by congressional macho posturing, it seems to be something driven by people who aren't watching where they're going. In July 1988, a senior administration official, briefing reporters on a trip by Secretary of State Shultz to Asia, was asked what measures the United States had in mind to keep Pol Pot from returning to power. "This is not anything that we have carefully worked out, by any means, or thought about to the degree, or extent of what is possible," he said, displaying a startling lack of follow-through.

Surely this is geopoliticism run amuck. Set aside for a moment whether Cambodia should have been seen as a superpower cockpit at all. Where else in the world are we continuing to pursue a policy which began as anti-Soviet and pro-Chinese? Not only have these two powers since swapped images—they're not even that mad at each other anymore. Remember that it was Gorbachev's visit to Beijing that forestalled the crackdown on the Tiananmen protesters.

While Vietnamese troops remained in Phnom Penh, the policy had some cover. It might have been asking too much of the U.S. body politic for it to condone the aggressive occupation of a neighbor by a country that had only lately been killing GIs. But it's 1990 now, and the Vietnamese have apparently pulled out and gone, leaving the Hun Sen regime they installed in their wake. It used to be that U.S. officials held out such a withdrawal as the goal they were after. As late as July 1988, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Gaston Sigur was telling Congress: "We have refrained from establishing normal diplomatic relations with Vietnam as a demonstration of our opposition to Vietnam's illegal occupation of Cambodia."

U.S. Far Eastern policy had become obsessed with keeping China happy. And the Chinese wanted the United States to support the Khmer Rouge.

Is any change in U.S. attitude imminent? Probably not, if Secretary of State James Baker's comments on the subject early this year are indicative. At the Senate Foreign Relations Committee annual kickoff hearing, Sen. John Kerry questioned the continued full support of the tripartite resistance: "I'm deeply concerned that our current policy . . . is perhaps playing a greater role in facilitating the return of the Khmer Rouge than we would like." In reply, Secretary Baker held out the promise of a UN-negotiated political settlement. "I don't think that simply saying, well, let's recognize Hun Sen, let's talk to him now that Vietnam has left, is an answer that will get the U.S. where we want to go," said Baker. Where Baker, sponsor of two secret post-Tiananmen, high-level China missions, wants to go is Beijing.

Perhaps all parties involved will reach agreement on a transitional UN administration, and elections that cause the Khmer Rouge to fade gently into history will follow. Perhaps. But Sihanouk himself has said that a UN role could require that a multinational

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peacekeeping force—presumably to protect against the Khmer Rouge—remain in the country for 10 years or more.

Equally unlikely is a peace agreement calling for a transitional power-sharing arrangement among the three resistance factions and Hun Sen. Such an all-party coalition would be "extremely fragile and easily shattered so that it would not last long," judges a U.S. Army War College study.

Gathering evidence indicates that Hun Sen is neither an abandoned puppet nor a closet Khmer Rouge but the closest thing to a legitimate leader that the traumatized nation has had in many years.

Joel Charny, the regional director of Oxfam America, a nonprofit international agency that funds development and disaster relief in poor countries, was impressed by a visit to Cambodia earlier this year. As far as he could see, all Vietnamese troops and advisers had indeed left. In Phnom Penh "whole streets that were blocked off because Vietnamese advisers lived there are now open. People bicycle down them," he says. Charny says the most important thing is that Hun Sen has struggled to rebuild the country and shows little evidence of Khmer Rouge-like brutality. Compared to the tripartite resistance, "I'll take Hun Sen," says Charny.

Start a war, lose a turn

Throughout the years of the Reagan and Bush administrations, rhetoric against the Khmer Rouge has increased, but the policy of tacit support has persisted, as China continues to cast its large shadow over the problem. In deference to China, the ASEAN nations have taken a strong stand against Vietnam from the first days of the Cambodian operation.

Even so, Thailand, the ASEAN nation closest to the action, has shown more courage on this point than the United States has. Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan has hosted three Hun Sen visits, and in January, 90 Thai MPs delivered Chatichai a petition calling for the ouster of Cambodian guerrillas, including the Khmer Rouge, from Thai territory.

As for Prince Sihanouk, he is no longer the man he was. He seems a captive of the Khmer Rouge even as he denounces them. "The Prince's entourage is penetrated by the Khmer Rouge . . . his army is likewise penetrated in key positions. So it would be grossly imprudent not to regard him as to all intents and purposes a Khmer Rouge stooge," concludes John Pedler, a British journalist.

Somewhere along the way, the concept of morality was left out of U.S. approaches to Cambodia. There doesn't seem to be much weighing as to whether it is right to grope for a perceived advantage in the superpower game by allowing the most evil political faction in the world to continue to exist, not to mention to support it. It is not enough to say we abhor it and will throw it away when it is no longer militarily useful; the thing to be disposed of may not cooperate. Will they really just wither away, these men who have killed millions? In Washington, assistant secretaries like to think they are tough. In reality, they are men with drivers who cannot imagine the toughness of those in the jungle.

The problem is that so often there is legitimate moral ambiguity in foreign policy. Was it right to invade Panama, killing civilians and U.S. troops, if democracy was the result? Is it moral to take bread from the mouth of a worker in South Africa through economic sanctions, if the end is pressure on the white regime? Is covert lethal aid always wrong? If it is, what about our role in Afghanistan? These are arguable questions, and the Fletcher School of Diplomacy types who run U.S. foreign policy learn to set them aside to prevent paralysis so that they can focus on perceived national interest. That's what realpolitik is all about. If an ethical impact statement had to be compiled for every U.S. action in the world, there wouldn't be any.

As a result, the Fletcher class leaves its "moral judgment" switch off. When a policy rolls in that is clearly wrong, it still gets waved right on through the planning department. Most officials just aren't used to thinking in moral terms. The very phrase makes them uncomfortable, or impatient, or angry. They call it a simplistic way of looking at the world. It is, but that doesn't mean some policies aren't just plain wrong.

In Cambodia the U.S. has been playing "Diplomacy: The Exciting Game of International Intrigue." This is a real board game published by Avalon Hill—a classic, in which every participant can play Metternich with his schemes. "Diplomacy" appeals to the Washington policy class. (I know. I play it with them myself.) It is set in the year 1901, in Europe. Players become one of the Great Powers, and negotiate with the others to strike alliances, make attacks, and divide up the spoils. It is full of conversations such as this: "If you support my Army Ruhr into Belgium, Bill's Army Gascony will be forced to cover Brest, thereby preventing him from building a fleet and allowing you to move into the Mid-Atlantic in two turns to make a strategic thrust at Portugal and Spain."

The glow of laying schemes is the thing. They never work out—but, oh, weren't they brilliant?

This fallacy of statesmanship animates the U.S. approach to Cambodia. We have a scheme. The problem is, the Khmer Rouge have guns. □

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White Coats, Black Deeds

The new scientific method: lie, cheat, and get good PR

by David P. Hamilton

Late one afternoon in 1983, a senior mental health researcher named Robert Sprague was beginning to suspect that something was wrong. Steven Breuning, a young doctor at the University of Pittsburgh, was studying drug treatments for hyperactive retarded children that contradicted the field's conventional wisdom. The established treatment called for using strong tranquilizers, but Breuning had concluded that taking patients off the tranquilizers could double their IQ scores. The state of Connecticut had already amended its treatment practices to conform to Breuning's groundbreaking research.

There was only one problem: Breuning's results were too good. In his studies, teams of nurses had subjectively ranked the violence of arm and leg seizures to gauge drug effectiveness. Improbably, Breuning's laboratory notebooks showed perfect agreement among different nurses' rankings. Worse yet, the notebooks recorded studies in one year that would have taken 270 working days—but Sprague knew there had been only 260 working days and that Breuning was doing other time-consuming studies at the same time. The data had been faked.

Shaken, Sprague wrote a letter to the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), the federal agency that funded the fraudulent research. He returned to his own work, confident that the matter was settled, only to find months later that the NIMH was investigating *his* research, not Breuning's. Meanwhile, the university had learned of the possible fraud and launched its own, superficial investigation. Three months later, Breuning confessed and quietly resigned; the university then dropped its investigation—leaving the bad research unretracted. After another 14 months, the NIMH finally turned to investigating Breuning, taking a year and a half to conclude that the bulk of seven studies was faked. It cut off his research funding and recommended him to the Justice Department for prosecution. Until his conviction on federal fraud charges, however, Breuning continued to conduct research for another mental health center. Sprague, meanwhile, found his own NIMH research funding cut, despite favorable peer reviews. A NIMH official described the cut as a "coincidence."

A disheartening experience? Absolutely. A typical one? Maybe not, but did you know that investigators from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) are checking into suspicions that Robert Gallo, one of the nation's premier biomedical scientists, stole credit for discovering the AIDS virus? The question of how much biomedical research is contaminated by

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misconduct—fraud, "nonstandard" research practices, commercial conflicts of interest, overstated conclusions, and careless error—has no concrete answer. When it occurs, however, misconduct often has concrete results. Consider the following cases:

➤ Under pressure to bring its blood clot-dissolving drug (known as tissue plasminogen activator, or TPA) to market before a competitor released a cheaper product, the biotechnology firm Genentech funded a major effort in conjunction with the NIH in which several laboratories studied the drug. Victor Marder, a member of the study's safety monitoring board, testified before Congress that when he and another board member raised questions about the dosages used in the TPA studies, the NIH dismissed his board and appointed a new one. Researchers twice increased the dosage without safety board approval, and several patients on the highest dose suffered brain hemorrhages. Five out of 311 died—3 within 24 hours of treatment. Years later, congressional investigators discovered that 14 scientists in the study or their close relatives owned Genentech stock.

➤ In 1986, Betty Eldreth, a 37-year-old woman with a history of breast cancer, underwent surgery at the Duke University Medical Center after a lump in her abdomen was diagnosed as cancerous. Upon cutting her open, Eldreth's doctors found no trace of malignancy. Eldreth had previously gone through two months of needless radiation treatment for cancer diagnosed in one of her ribs. Later, a doctor checking into Eldreth's case discovered that the misdiagnoses resulted from an experimental test known as B72.3, which William Johnston, a Duke pathologist, was researching and wrongly using as a final arbiter of cancer. Johnston, who is chief of the cytopathology and cytogenetics division at the Duke University Hospital, began using the test in late 1984; within a year, he was performing a hundred tests a month and receiving $15,000 a month in extra fees, despite instructions from the Pathology Department chairman to use the method "sparingly" (Johnston was later barred from taking the fees). In March 1987, Johnston signed a contract in which he agreed to supply a Massachusetts firm with B72.3 in return for a 20 percent commission on sales—money credited to his research account at Duke.

Duke has done its best to hush up the case, posting armed guards at the medical school to keep out a "20/20" camera crew and appointing largely ineffective committees to investigate the test's use. The university still has not explained how Eldreth's case occurred (she settled her lawsuit out of court). Meanwhile, if Eldreth develops cancer again (a distinct possibility), she will be unable to undergo any more radiation therapy, having already received maximum exposure.

● Scheffer Tseng, a Harvard Medical School fellow from 1984 to 1986, ran a clinical trial of a vitamin A lotion on "dry eye"—a condition caused by several diseases that can destroy the cornea and lead to blindness. Tseng never published his results. He had good reason not to, since they demonstrated that the vitamin A ointment he was using didn't work. Tseng and his clinical supervisor Kenneth Kenyon owned large blocks of stock in Spectra Pharmaceutical Services, a New Hampshire company formed to purchase patent rights to the vitamin A treatment. When Spectra went public in the middle of 1985, Tseng and Kenyon suddenly had strong incentives to cover up bad news. As the tests continued to show inconclusive results, Tseng's behavior became increasingly bizarre. He changed drug dosages and sometimes treated patients with additional drugs without their consent. There's no evidence that patients were harmed by any of this, but all of these practices were clearly unscientific and completely unethical. Today, Tseng, who says he "just followed orders" from Kenyon, conducts research at the University of Miami Medical School. Although he denies the story, *The Boston Globe* reported that Tseng and his relatives made more than $1 million from selling their Spectra stock.

● At the University of Pittsburgh, pediatric researcher Charles Bluestone accepted $17.5 million from the NIH to run clinical trials of amoxicillin, an antibiotic that Bluestone claimed was effective in treating children's ear infections. Meanwhile, Bluestone also received $3.5 million in research funds and more than $250,000 in honoraria and travel fees from pharmaceutical companies with interests in the study. When Erdem Cantekin, another researcher in the study, charged that Bluestone had withheld data showing that amoxicillin was no more effective than other drugs, the university fired Cantekin and initiated a spurious misconduct investigation against him.

Drug money

As these examples show, people can get hurt when science goes bad. That's why it's crucial to identify and eliminate the cultural and commercial forces that foster scientific misconduct. "What is surprising . . . is that the system of science works sluggishly or actually works against a speedy, appropriate adjudication of suspected misconduct," Robert Sprague told a convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. "It is not only surprising, it is intolerable in a civilized society."

Study several cases of misconduct, and common threads begin to form ominous patterns. Government

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agencies fail to exercise proper oversight—like the NIMH in the Breuning case—while universities cover up well-supported allegations of fraud or bungle investigations. Committees write reports soft-pedaling conclusions that reflect badly on important scientists. Whistleblowers are blacklisted as troublemakers or shut out of scientific research—like Bruce Hollis, who as a junior professor at Case Western University was fired and pilloried in the local media after he publicly accused his former supervisor of inept research practices. Prominent scientists take the Ed Meese line—like Duke's William Johnston, who argues his test wasn't experimental despite evidence to the contrary, and who claims exoneration because he didn't commit any technical violations of FDA or university regulations. Charges are proven true only after whistleblowers devote years of effort and make enormous sacrifices—as in the cases of Hollis, Sprague, and many, many others. It's hard to escape the impression that high stakes prompt prominent scientists and their institutions—what might fairly be called the "scientific establishment"—to forgive and dismiss instances of bad science far too easily.

"The custom is that errors are buried and forgotten," says Charles McCutcheon, an NIH scientist. Unfortunately, such burials aren't always figurative.

Too often, misconduct is explained away as the result of individual character flaws. These explanations neglect how the scientific culture has been shaped by competition and money. Over the past 10 years, biomedical science has become big business. The biotechnology industry, which started up only in 1980, now includes more than 500 companies with annual sales of $1 billion. Last year, the NIH distributed nearly $7 billion in 5,300 new and continuing research grants—an average of $1.3 million per grant. The infusion of money and public attention brought on by the AIDS epidemic and advances in molecular biology, immunology, and medical research have changed the traditional incentives for scientific research. New tensions tug at the laboratories of major universities: competition for grants, tenured positions, and high-profile committee assignments, as well as commercial incentives offered by biotechnology firms, such as consultation contracts, honoraria, and patent fees.

Rather than a pure end in itself, science is considered more like a commodity that can enhance a university's reputation, enrollment, or faculty. As Cornell sociologist Dorothy Nelkin documents in her book, *Selling Science*, scientists and university administrators now try to draw media attention for their discoveries—a direct result of increased competition for government and industry funding. Most major universities and hospitals employ full-time public relations staffs for this purpose. The commercial value of their scientific efforts makes it hard for universities to admit when something goes wrong. Scientists have internalized this defensive ethic, often refusing to admit even natural and entirely forgivable errors in scientific journals. "The literature is full of bits and pieces now known to be wrong, but it is not the tradition to point out each one publicly," Nobel laureate David Baltimore once wrote to a colleague. "The custom is that errors are buried and forgotten," says Charles McCutcheon, an NIH scientist with a long-standing interest in misconduct. Unfortunately, as the Genentech episode with TPA showed, in contemporary science such burials aren't always figurative.

Ties that blind

These pressures affect research in insidious ways. A typical biomedical laboratory costs between $500,000 and $2 million to run—and research funding isn't easy to get these days. Several years ago, NIH began to fund longer-term grants, which recently led to a shortage of money for new research projects and a decline in award rates to 29 percent. Scientists are feeling the pinch—and the temptation to exaggerate the significance of their results. "If your funding is cut off, you can teach, but you can't do any research," says Jonathan King, an MIT professor of molecular biology. "Scientific gossip these days is concerned with how to get funding and whether results are 'sexy' enough [for the NIH]."

In some universities, as many as 30 percent of biomedical researchers have consulting or other business relationships with biotechnology firms, according to Sheldon Krimsky, a Tufts University professor

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who maintains a database of such ties. Some researchers hold stock in companies whose products they evaluate. Despite the clear conflicts of interest posed by such ties, they are effectively unregulated. Last year, when the NIH proposed a rule which would have prohibited researchers with commercial ties from using federal funds for their work, it was withdrawn after intense lobbying by university and company officials and researchers. Carol Scheman, an analyst with the American Association of Universities, argues against such a ban on the grounds that university-industry ties are so close that the rule would have made research "nearly impossible to do." Well, if the tie is that close it deserves more, not less scrutiny. At the very least, full disclosure of such ties—something that is hardly the academic norm—seems called for.

Scientists have long claimed that extensive government regulation of their field is unnecessary because science contains "self-correcting" mechanisms. By publishing their work in peer-reviewed scientific journals, for instance, scientists make their results widely available to one another for comment and criticism. And because scientific experiments are replicable, error-ridden or fraudulent results should be quickly exposed.

In general, these scientists are right. Peer review and replication serve science well, particularly at the cutting edge of research where they efficiently filter out bad theories and experimental error. But especially when science is closer to the market place, these mechanisms sometimes work very slowly or break down altogether. Breuning, for example, was able to fake his research results for at least three years without detection—and even then, his fraud was discovered only after Sprague asked him for his patient records.

Dopes or dope pushers?

No one denies that scientific misconduct is a serious problem when it occurs. The disagreement is over how often it takes place, and consequently how serious a danger it poses. Most scientists hold that the problem is minor—like Daniel Koshland Jr., editor of the well-respected journal *Science*, who editorialized in 1988 that "99.9999 percent of reports are accurate and truthful." On the other hand, Harold Green, a law professor at George Washington University who represented a whistleblower in a science fraud case, recently told *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, "I hear from younger scientists that, in their opinion, there is an awful lot of fudging on research results."

Although no one really knows how much misconduct goes on, there are a couple of indirect estimates. Neither is particularly encouraging. One comes from the Food and Drug Administration, which randomly audits 5 to 10 percent of all clinical drug trials—often the last regulatory step before drugs are sold to the public. Given the immediate consequences for public health in these trials, you'd expect them to be exacting. Guess again.

Since 1977, FDA auditors found that at least a quarter of these studies were flawed by poor research procedures, failure to account for all of the drugs used in the trials, or inaccurate recordkeeping, according to Alan Lisook, who oversees the audits. Nearly 10 percent of the studies received official reprimands, a step which calls the research conclusions into question. In 12 years, the agency banned more than 50 scientists from testing experimental drugs because they submitted false technical reports or conducted careless research. Sixteen were criminally prosecuted, and at least four served jail time. Although these overall figures are slightly misleading—the actual number of reprimands has been dropping in recent years, a fact which FDA officials attribute to stricter supervision from the drug companies—the numbers imply that at least 200 drug trials since 1977 have been untrustworthy.

When NIH scientists Ned Feder and Walter Stewart studied the investigation of Harvard cardiologist James Darsee—who resigned in 1981 after admitting that he'd faked several heart studies—they found that 28 percent of his 47 coauthors had committed other serious errors, such as printing misleading statements, republishing old material under new titles, failing to acknowledge contributions from other researchers, or ignoring complaints that colleagues might be involved in "questionable data collection." In the most celebrated example, the published lineage of a family with a high incidence of heart disease included one 17-year-old man with four children aged four to eight—implying that he fathered his oldest child at age nine. Despite favorable comments from peer reviewers, Stewart's and Feder's manuscript languished for three years before being published, because journal editors who initially expressed interest in it received libel threats from some of the coauthors examined in the study.

The dweeb patrol

Once such cases began getting publicity, it was only a matter of time before Congress got involved. When Rep. John Dingell learned about the treatment of Robert Sprague, he turned the investigative powers of the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations to probing cases of scientific misconduct. By now, probably no politi-

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cian is despised as much within the scientific community as Dingell. Although Dingell has long supported funding for agencies like the NIH (and, in fact, has a brother who's a researcher in the Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute at the NIH), scientists widely believe that he is out to discredit the agency and the field of scientific research in general. "There's an internal struggle in Congress over which sectors of the budget are to be cut," said Jonathan King of MIT, who wrote a letter to the MIT faculty newsletter denouncing Dingell. "Dingell's investigation is the opening salvo in discrediting the NIH."

Dingell is used to provoking reactions like these. In the 14 years since he assumed the chairmanship of the Energy and Commerce committee, he has roasted General Dynamics for overcharging the Pentagon, survived FBI smears while investigating the nuclear power industry and Karen Silkwood's mysterious death, and forced accountants to regulate their profession when they were giving financially troubled businesses clean bills of health. Dingell's interest in scientific misconduct boils down to concern over how public money—like the $7 billion annually distributed by the NIH—is spent. He has never suggested a legislative remedy for misconduct, preferring to see universities and the NIH put their own safeguards in place—although he doesn't mind sowing a little constructive terror in the process. "If that's the only consequence—we're frightening them—I would say that's probably a desirable result," he once said.

Cell division

Uncovering misconduct is difficult enough, but a little media savvy can make a scientist's defenses even tougher to penetrate. When Dingell began checking into allegations of misconduct involving a paper published in *Cell* by MIT biomedical researcher David Baltimore and four co-authors, Baltimore's PR effort effectively cast the investigation as an assault on the basic integrity of science—a message easily picked up and amplified by journalists unequal to the technical complexity of the case. Baltimore's own work on the paper has never been questioned, but he was quick to assume the role of public spokesman for the co-authors once Dingell's investigation began in early 1988. As director of the MIT-affiliated Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research, he had the resources and cachet to cover for Thereza Imanishi-Kari, the Tufts University scientist whose contributions to the paper were certainly erroneous and possibly fraudulent. Baltimore has lavishly praised Imanishi-Kari while doing his best to discredit Margot O'Toole, the postdoctoral student who first pointed out errors in the paper. Since research like Baltimore's could provide clues to combatting the AIDS virus, you'd think the integrity of his results would be his highest priority.

O'Toole grew suspicious after having trouble repeating one of Imanishi-Kari's experiments. After several months of frustrating attempts, she turned to the laboratory's old mouse breeding records, hoping to find an explanation for what she thought were her own errors. Instead she found 17 pages of data, many of them describing experiments that contradicted the results published in the *Cell* paper.

Researchers twice increased the dosages without safety board approval, and several patients on the highest dose suffered brain hemorrhages. Five died.

Initially, O'Toole took her concerns to her thesis advisor, but never got a fair hearing. Inquiries at MIT and Tufts dismissed her conclusions as "differences of scientific interpretation"—but no one at MIT ever examined the original data, and, according to O'Toole, the Tufts committee was more interested in protecting Imanishi-Kari's career than in learning the truth. O'Toole left Tufts after Imanishi-Kari asked her not to return, and has not worked in science since. O'Toole's steadiest job through the intervening years has been answering telephones at her brother's moving company.

The NIH's treatment of the case has been woeful. Its first investigative panel included two immunologists who had previously collaborated in research with Baltimore. A second NIH panel cleared the authors of fraud and misconduct while criticizing them for "serious errors and inadequacies" in their re-

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search—but it misconstrued a number of O'Toole's criticisms and ignored convincing evidence. For instance, Imanishi-Kari claimed that some of the data in the contested 17 pages, though mistakenly garbled, supported her published conclusions. But when a Dingell investigator unscrambled the data with a personal computer, they turned out to contradict her conclusions after all. The panel's report never mentioned that, and also unaccountably omitted words of praise for O'Toole which had existed in earlier drafts. Only after Dingell brought in the Secret Service to analyze Imanishi-Kari's notebooks was the NIH embarrassed enough to open a third investigation, this time with the intention of performing an extensive data audit.

These investigations may have had one dramatic if unintended effect—that of inducing Imanishi-Kari to cross the line from error into fraud. Allegedly, Imanishi-Kari provided the Tufts panel with unpublished data that, if true, would refute O'Toole's complaints. But forensic evidence provided by the Secret Service last year shows that these particular notebook pages, which bore dates from 1984 and 1985, were actually written later, at the time of the Tufts investigation—despite Imanishi-Kari's earlier assurance that all laboratory notes had been assembled while the research was going on.

Spin doctor

From the beginning, Baltimore's defense has been to cast Dingell as the Grand Inquisitor of Science. Shortly after Dingell's first hearings in April 1988, Baltimore launched a media offensive, circulating 400 copies of a "Dear Colleague" letter which supported Imanishi-Kari's story, reduced O'Toole's concerns to "alternate interpretations," and accused Dingell's investigators of using the case to "catalyze the introduction of new laws and regulations that could cripple American science." Philip Sharp, director of the MIT Cancer Center, took Baltimore's cue and distributed his own letter with the help of the Whitehead public relations staff. Sharp's packet included helpful "talking points" and asked scientists to write their newspapers and congressmen to protest Dingell's "witch hunt." These tactics succeeded famously. Dingell's subcommittee received hundreds of angry letters from scientists, few of them familiar with the facts, but all uniformly hostile to what they saw as a congressional attack on science. When Dingell called a second set of hearings on the case, the audience was filled with scientists friendly to Baltimore and hostile to O'Toole. Some snickered as O'Toole described her difficulty finding a job after leaving Tufts at Imanishi-Kari's behest.

Baltimore's PR didn't stop when Dingell called his co-authors to testify last May. Whitehead money paid for a prestigious Washington law firm to prep him for the hearings. In the last half-hour of a long day's session, Baltimore ambushed Dingell, saying the congressman had sprung forensic evidence on the authors (Dingell's staff actually presented the authors with the evidence in a five-hour meeting the day before) and unjustly accusing him of "fraud" (based on a misleading *Boston Globe* article in April 1988). As far as the press was concerned, this dramatic confrontation became the story, which suited Baltimore just fine. He'd spent much of the previous day crisscrossing the city to sell his story to reporters from *The Washington Post, The New York Times,* and *The Wall Street Journal,* and had spoken the night before to an uncritical audience at the D.C. Science Writer's Association.

Post-hearing coverage was overwhelmingly pro-Baltimore. *The Washington Post* wrote the case up as "Science Under Fire," emphasizing Baltimore's numerous scientific accomplishments and his victory over Dingell. *The New York Times* played the hearings straight during the week (which meant emphasizing the confrontation), but ran a "Week in Review" piece the following Sunday titled "Anxiety Over the Science Police" in which various scientists worried endlessly that Congress would "regiment" science and stifle creativity. *The Wall Street Journal*'s Washington columnist Paul Gigot contributed the "Latest Chapter in the Fine Science of the Smear." Dingell's hometown newspaper, *The Detroit News,* castigated "Dingell's New Galileo Trial." Only *The Boston Globe,* which carefully examined O'Toole's allegations and evidence, avoided the stampede.

Like the scientific community itself, reporters have been reluctant to delve too deeply into technical issues of the case. But the two reporters who did attempt to penetrate the fog of scientific minutiae—Diana West of *The Washington Times* and Philip Weiss, writing in *The New York Times Magazine*—found a whole new layer to the story, one that led them to be critical of Baltimore. When Dingell revealed his forensic evidence during the hearings, for instance, most published accounts described it in point-counterpoint fashion: Imanishi-Kari's notes were out of order and had been redated, but she explained that she was a sloppy notekeeper who often recopied her work. Only West and Weiss realized that Imanishi-Kari's unpublished data—the linchpin of her defense—had been written up not only long after the paper was published, but while the Tufts panel was investigating it.

Journalists are susceptible to spin like Baltimore's because of the mystique associated with prominent scientists and the difficulty most reporters—even sci-

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ence reporters—have weighing the merits of scientific claims. Baltimore's defenders have been quick to emphasize his weighty scientific contributions, his "towering genius," and the complexity of the science—as if these factors had anything to do with whether Imanishi-Kari willfully misinterpreted her data.

In a fascinating postmortem twist, Baltimore was elected last June to chair the Scientist's Institute for Public Information, an organization which encourages the media to handle science issues in a "good and honest" fashion. Baltimore insists that the timing was a "sheer accident" (he previously sat on SIPI's board of directors) and that his experience with Congress won't "in any way taint" his involvement with the media. Sure.

Lab test or self-examination?

While outright fraud is not difficult to recognize, most scientific misconduct is more complicated. Take David Baltimore. Can his eagerness to use his considerable influence to defend bad research be considered misconduct? Did his co-authorship of a paper make him responsible for the soundness of its research and conclusions? Amazingly, according to current NIH guidelines—the most widely applicable rules around—the answer to both questions is no. These rules condemn "fabrication, falsification, plagiarism, or other practices which seriously deviate from those that are commonly accepted within the scientific community for proposing, conducting, or reporting research." The catch lies in those practices which aren't "commonly accepted," a squirmy phrase that reduces consideration of that vast gray continuum between fraud and honest error to a matter of "professional judgment," to borrow a term from Suzanne Hadley, acting director of the NIH's new Office of Scientific Integrity.

But determining misconduct requires more common sense than "professional judgment." Even a nonscientist knows it isn't fair to change the rules in the middle of the game—but that's what William Johnston did when he changed his experimental protocol while evaluating the B72.3 test. Everyone knows that your credibility suffers if you undertake an evaluation with a financial interest in a particular outcome—but the thought never seems to have crossed the minds of Scheffer Tseng and Kenneth Kenyon as they tested their Vitamin A lotion, or of the scientists who evaluated TPA for Genentech while holding stock in the company. And it should be utterly obvious—so clear that it's almost embarrassing to make the point—that pointing out mistakes should get you rewarded, not blamed, blacklisted, or fired. The NIH guidelines clearly miss these points—as well as the larger one: Bad science can hurt people.

Two years ago, in response to several serious cases of fraud in the previous decade, the Harvard Medical School distributed a set of recommendations specifying accepted research practices, so that research groups could develop their own written policies. As a result, when a Harvard visiting scientist faked the discovery of a new antibody called interleukin-4A in 1986, investigators were quick to examine his raw data and discover his fraud.

Federal funding agencies would be smart to follow Harvard's example. Here are some practices they should consider:

- *Enunciate research and data-handling guidelines.* Clear guidelines on laboratory procedures, statistical methods, and supervision of research trainees would make misconduct easier to identify. These agencies should also require researchers to hold on to their primary data for at least 10 years, making it available to other scientists upon request. Surprisingly, many scientists are hesitant to share their data. Baltimore, for instance, testified that he never asked Imanishi-Kari for her original data, because doing so would have signified a breach of trust.
- *Enforce "primary authorship."* Requiring that scientific papers bear a "primary author" responsible for the data and conclusions would not only add another layer of review, but also improve communication between authors, reducing the potential for misunderstanding and inadvertent error.
- *Regulate conflicts of interest.* Scientists and members of their immediate families should fully disclose any financial interests that might influence research. If misconduct as a result of commercial ties persists, researchers who maintain such ties should be barred from receiving federal funds.
- *Make the bureaucracy work.* More than a year ago, the NIH created the Office of Scientific Integrity as a clearinghouse for investigating allegations of scientific misconduct. It was a good idea, but OSI still has no permanent director and suffers from a lack of focus. (In this sense, OSI mirrors the generally disorganized condition of the NIH, which also lacks a director.) The NIH needs to appoint an activist director who will exhort universities to adopt—and enforce—strict misconduct guidelines.
- *Fund duplication of research.* As things stand, federal agencies don't give grants for duplicating existing research, only for extending it. Changing this practice wouldn't be a bad idea. In fact, it would be easier in many situations to resolve allegations of misconduct by letting a whistleblower try to duplicate contested research than by forming traditional

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investigative committees.

• *Hold a "scientific audit."* Drummond Rennie, an editor of the *Journal of the American Medical Association*, has suggested that scientists conduct a confidential, "scientific" audit in order to determine the extent of research malpractice. In such an audit, retired scientists would exhaustively examine the work in a few hundred randomly selected laboratories. "No one has a clue how much fraud is out there," Rennie says. "We have to come up with a better answer than that we don't think it's very common." Although scientists haven't been particularly excited by the idea, Rennie thinks it would be a deterrent to further Congressional investigation. "I believe that Congress would be impressed by scientists getting scientific about science this way," he says.

None of this will work, of course, if institutions don't *follow* their guidelines. That's where the government comes in. Dingell's current bad-cop routine is probably the best way to get institutions to take the

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

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problem of scientific misconduct seriously. But if universities and hospitals continue to react like Duke or the University of Pittsburgh, more government intervention will follow. If it becomes necessary, the least disruptive course of action would be to institute random audits of clinical research, like the audits the FDA currently conducts.

"Science flourishes best if scientists are given broad latitude in ordering their own affairs," wrote Bernard Davis, a Harvard Medical School emeritus professor, last year in *The Wall Street Journal*. Maybe so. But the cases of Baltimore, Johnston, Tseng, and the rest suggest that they're not doing a very good job. Scientists owe it to themselves to address the issue of scientific misconduct. Nothing is clearer than that Congress will do it for them, given the threat to patients and the pressures to spend federal funds wisely. If researchers want to keep the "science police" out of their laboratories, they had better straighten them up themselves. And soon. □

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MARION BARRY JR
MAYOR

February 17, 1989

Ms. Marilou Righini
Chairperson
Kalorama Citizen Association
1921 Biltmore Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009

Dear Ms. Righini:

Let me take this opportunity to thank you for your hands on participation in issues which effect the city and particularly your community.

Congratulations to the Citizens Committee for the Ellington and Taft Bridges for taking an active role to involve the community in what I am sure, will be a most successful workshop.

I am providing you with a copulatión of answers to several questions raised regarding the Duke Ellington and Taft Bridges. I hope you'll find it useful for the workshop program.

We will meet again in the near future for continued dialogue about common concerns and goals in your community.

Again, thank you for your continued efforts in working with my administration for a higher quality of life for all the people of our great city.

Sincerely,

Marion Barry, Jr.
Mayor

Enclosure

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The Academic Side-step

Academic freedom is supposed to foster debate. So why do college presidents use it to avoid tough issues?

by Scott Shuger

Last summer the Justice Department announced that it was investigating whether a group of Ivy League and other elite colleges and universities had illegally conspired to fix tuition fees and financial aid packages for admitted students. The idea behind the inquiry—that price fixing is just as illegal when done by college presidents, provosts, and deans as it is when done by arms manufacturers or building contractors—seems to have genuinely surprised and appalled most academic administrators.

So far, the schools haven't said much in response because the probe is still in its early fact-finding stages—although some of them admit to participating in interschool committees formed to set uniform scholarship awards for accepted applicants. But a sneak preview of the likely academic response can be found in a footnote to a recent *Yale Law Journal* article by Prof. J. Peter Byrne of Georgetown University: ". . . [C]ourts should not subject agreements relating to educational policy, such as standards for accreditation or principles of financial aid, to antitrust liability . . . . The Justice Department's current investigation into whether certain private colleges and universities have agreed on tuition or financial aid policies in violation of the antitrust laws . . . seems on this ground grossly misconceived and potentially in violation of constitutional academic freedom." Let the arms manufacturers and contractors try using that one! When it comes to protecting themselves from outside control or scrutiny, when it comes to doing things because well, they just want to, it doesn't take long for universities to run for their unique brand of all-purpose protective cover: academic freedom.

Scott Shuger is an editor of *The Washington Monthly*. Research assistance was provided by John Heilemann, Ethan Feinsilver, and Donne Masaki.

Harvard to world: Buzz off

As defensive buzzwords go, "academic freedom" is pretty powerful. It's the collegiate equivalent of "national security." Learning is good and liberty is good, so the two together should settle most anything, right? Well it depends what you mean. Most of the current crop of college officials understand the principle of academic freedom (PAF) as something like "You can't interfere with particular points of view held in the university." In other words, to them it means "Buzz off." (That was certainly the interpretation made by a lot of academics in connection with the David Baltimore case—see "White Coats, Black Deeds," p. 23. Phillip Sharp, the director of cancer research at MIT, warned in a letter he sent to col-

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leagues across the country that the congressional fraud investigation of Baltimore's work should be halted because it "will discourage young scientists from exploring new and untested ideas and even keep students from choosing science as a career.")

The original purpose of PAF was to ensure that professors would not be fired because of the views they held. But today's generation of college executives has been quite imaginative in widening PAF's application. Still, while the particulars can range considerably, the logical role of PAF doesn't vary much from one school to another. It's like a dance step that's done the same from coast to coast. Apparently, IBM, GM, the World Bank, the Ford Foundation, and the other corporate pipelines for increasing numbers of college administrators have formed an ideological Arthur Murray's to give us a new campus dance craze—the Academic Side-Step. Consider:

As defensive buzzwords go, "academic freedom" is pretty powerful. It's the collegiate equivalent of "national security."

- A California court ruled in favor of a coalition representing small growers and farmworkers that had sued the University of California for using public monies to develop agricultural technologies serving only large agribusiness corporations, at the expense of family farms and farmworker jobs. This landmark decision required the university to formulate a plan for bringing its research into line with the needs of a broader spectrum of the public that supports it. University Counsel Gary Morrison condemned it as "unwarranted interference" in academic affairs that would endanger the autonomy of the university and threaten academic freedom.

- When the head of the appropriations committee of the Vermont House of Representatives, Michael Obuchowski, asked the University of Vermont to disclose its bid procedures and faculty salaries, he was initially stonewalled by school administrators on the grounds that complying with these straightforward requests violated academic freedom. "The university," says Obuchowski, "wants to be public when that best suits it but private when that best suits it."

- When the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) subpoenaed the evaluation records of a female professor who was turned down for tenure by the University of Pennsylvania, in order to check for gender bias, the university refused to comply, claiming that turning over such materials would infringe upon academic freedom. Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Brown, Stanford, and the American Association of University Professors all supported this tack. Although the Supreme Court recently ruled in favor of the EEOC subpoena, the decision does not directly apply to private discrimination plaintiffs. In a similar but private discrimination case still in the courts, when a female Harvard professor who was denied tenure requested vote tally sheets and the records of successful male tenure candidates, the university refused, claiming "academic privilege." When the court decided to permit the plaintiff some access to these records anyway, Harvard made a revelation that said quite a lot about how it uses the "academic" defense: it admitted it had destroyed the files in question. The nation's richest university incinerated the 4.5 cubic feet of paperwork because of a "space problem."

- Carnegie Mellon University campaigned hard for and won a Department of Defense (DOD) contract to establish its Software Engineering Institute (SEI), which is primarily dedicated to perfecting the computer functions needed for Star Wars and precision weapons. It is estimated to account for around 40 percent of all of CMU's sponsored research funds. Although CMU President Richard Cyert originally promised that SEI would not engage in any classified research, this proved technically impossible. So Cyert forged an arrangement in which all classified research at CMU would be restricted to two "semi-autonomous units" including SEI. In defense of all this, SEI Director Larry Druffel said, "I don't think anybody should be forced to work on classified information. I don't think it would be fair because of academic freedom—because of just basic freedom. But the same basic freedoms guarantee those of us who might want to do classified work the opportunity to do it." CMU Provost (and SEI scientist) Angel Jordan said, "In these questions of public policy, it's not for me to tell you, from the top, that what you are do-

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ing is immoral, and it's not for the students and faculty members to tell me that what I am doing is immoral."

● When there was widespread concern at Stanford over the nuclear-weapons-related applications of research being conducted at laboratories there, the university reaffirmed its existing research policy: "Individual scholars should be free to select the subject matter of their research, to seek support from any source for their work . . . ." In defending that stance, Stanford President Donald Kennedy stated, "[The university] should allocate space, facilities, funds, and other resources for research programs based on the scholarly and educational merits of the proposed research, and not on speculations concerning the political and moral impropriety of the uses which might be made of its results . . . . Our policy is that Stanford scientists are free to conduct work of their own choosing as long as it can be carried out in accord with the principles of openness and freedom of publication."

With the help of academic freedom, it's astounding how uncurious some academics can be. Chemistry professor Louis Quin regards his DOD-sponsored work on the deadly anthrax virus as "just another way of getting basic research money. I'm not contributing to anything but basic knowledge and free publication."

Usually these sorts of campus issues involve large sums of money: CMU's software defense work brought it more than $100 million, and last year alone Stanford received $40 million in Defense Department research grants. Harvard's securities holdings in companies doing business in South Africa were recently assessed at $230 million. And the issues are admittedly complex: Does remaining engaged with the South African economy help or hurt blacks there? Is it better to do defense work or to let it proceed apace without outside tempering influences? So universities are excused for not moving precipitously on them. But that doesn't mean they should precipitously not move on them. Arguing out issues like these as well as more practical ones like tuition policies and hiring fairness is a good thing. We need more of it, not less. The irony is that academic freedom is supposed to *promote* such debates, not forestall them.

How did campus thinking about social responsibility get turned upside down like this? Administrators' remarks provide some good clues. Once I opened the alumni magazine from my alma mater, Carleton College, to find Robert Edwards, at the time the school's president (he has since left to go to work for the Aga Khan), explaining why Carleton should not divest its funds from corporations doing business in South Africa: "No one can or wishes to defend apartheid. But . . . to impose total divestiture on those who, for moral reasons, oppose boycotts would be to impose on an educational institution the 'single eye' that would be contrary to its nature. I've spent nine years here doing my best to preserve openness of debate—and to protect the college from taking dogmatic institutional positions." And in an interview, Princeton University President Harold Shapiro once told me, "Universities, I believe, ought not to be out there in the forefront of change, as an institution committed to one point of view. We may want to be out there as individuals, indeed I hope we are out there as individuals, but I think it would be quite a mistake to be out there as an institution sponsoring one particular perspective, because we want to be an institution which can harbor all kinds of points of view."

Edwards and Shapiro are making veiled appeals to the hard-nosed defense of civil liberty first popularized by the 19th-century English philosopher John Stuart Mill. But they keep getting Mill wrong. *His* version of PAF is: "The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." In setting out this doctrine, Mill was interested in shielding an individual's right to opinions from the powers of the state and other social institutions. As he puts it, "the inward domain of consciousness" is the "appropriate region of human liberty." He was most certainly *not* categorically defending the right of the government or any other powerful institution like a modern university to put opinions into *action*. Indeed, Mill expressly states that "no one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions. On the contrary, even opinions lose their immunity when the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to constitute in their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act." In

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other words, freedom of thought should be virtually sacrosanct on campus, but the minute universities *do* something, it's time for everyone else's gloves to come off. And with their increasing corporate and government ties, universities nowadays are nearly always doing something.

Mill's version of PAF still protects freedom of discussion in the classroom but wards off the widely held nonsense that universities are committed to value-indifference. Mill's principle tells us that our tolerance must cease when harm to others is its consequence.

Bok to Hutchins: Huh?

One of the chief reasons for believing in Mill's principle is that history is so replete with examples of the fallibility of human opinion. We started off believing that the solar system was geocentric, that witches would float, etc. The idea here is that if we are so prone to error in our beliefs, then we had better respect denials of them. But fallibility, like human knowledge, has its limits. Does anyone seriously think that we might someday discover reasons that would show that apartheid is permissible after all? If not, then the doctrine of apartheid can be specially exempted from the usual academic courtesies. It may not even be acceptable to believe in it, much less to support it financially.

In other words, this business of openness is full of nuance. That's precisely why universities are falling down when they defend their practices not by argument about their substantive merits but instead willy-nilly by the PAF gambit: "Although there might be difficulties with this, academic freedom constrains me or you from evaluating it." Universities should be the last place in America where waving a magic wand over a problem is preferred to thinking about it. But with the help of PAF, it's astounding how *un*curious some academics can be. At the University of Massachusetts, chemistry professor Louis Quin regards his DOD-sponsored work on the deadly anthrax virus as "just another way of getting basic research money. I'm not controlled by the Department of Defense. I'm not being manipulated by them. I'm not contributing to anything but basic knowledge and free publication. My job is to do basic research and let it be disseminated." Or consider the defense Harvard President Derek Bok gave of his institution's reluctance to divest all of its South African-involved stocks: "Universities have neither the mandate nor the competence to administer foreign policy, set our social and economic priorities, enforce standards of conduct in the society, or carry out other social functions apart from learning and discovery." I would hope that if a college president were going to maintain financial ties with South Africa, he'd have and offer some reasons for doing so. Academic freedom shouldn't obliterate moral responsibility or moral debate.

How far we've fallen from the understanding of Robert Maynard Hutchins, former president of the University of Chicago, who wrote: "To say, 'Let us gain knowledge and power and our ends will take care of themselves,' is not to fashion the intellect of the modern world but [is] to submit to it, for this is what the modern world is saying. Here the university abandons the task of intellectual leadership and mirrors, symbolizes, and justifies the great reversal of ends and means, which is the underlying disorder of our society. And it does so at a time when all we have to do is look around us to see that the growth of knowledge and power gives us no hint as to how to use them."

Besides fallibility, another reason Mill gave for adopting his PAF is that even if we are lucky enough to have a true belief, the absence of discussion soon transforms it into dogma. How ironic that in the current campus debates the most flagrant case of a dead doctrine seems to be the PAF itself in the hands of the administrators. It seems true to say of these educators, as Mill said of "the majority of believers" of Christianity, that they believe such a principle "as people believe what they have always heard lauded and never discussed." How else can you explain the educators' failure to appreciate the difference between private belief and institutional profit? Or their frequent supposition that divesting South African-involved stock or refusing missile research is a political act, while investing in the stock or engaging in the research is not?

Once you distinguish freedom of belief from freedom of action, it's not hard to see that *pace* Cyert, Kennedy, Edwards, Shapiro, Bok, and their ilk, the university's admitted interest in *intellectual* neutrality hardly requires *moral* neutrality. Even a cursory look around campus shows many values in place and working hard. Researchers have to abide by numerous guidelines governing human and animal research. Even with unprecedented cultural diversity, there is not, and never will be, a Hitler Studies Department. Plagiarism is a crime, punishable by expulsion. What kind of mind could live amidst all this and not see the values?

Only the corporate mind now dominating our campuses. In short, we are well on our way to "edu-business." And with the help of ivy-covered shibboleths like "academic freedom," edu-business promises to do every bit as much for the university as agri-business did for the family farm. □

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

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Will the Department of Energy Finally Stop Nuking America?

Prospects for national energy reform

by Peter Gray

January 26, 1990: The briefing room atmosphere was cheerful and relaxed. Several staff members seemed disappointed by the low press turnout. We waited for Department of Energy (DOE) second-in-command W. Henson Moore, the deputy secretary.

Moore started by announcing "the first policy initiative of its kind in a decade," then said, ". . . energy efficiency and renewables [are] the cleanest, cheapest, safest means of meeting our nation's needs in the 1990s and beyond."

". . . There's no need to wait for the 1991 budget; no need to wait for the National Energy Strategy to come out in the fall; we are going to start *today*. . . . It's time for the government to set an example. We've been talking about it for a decade; now is the time to *do* something about it. We will start this morning in this room."

The reporter next to me had dozed off. He had his press packet; why bother taking notes? Who would know that he had missed the off-script remarks? Here we were watching the Berlin Wall come down, and this guy was napping on the job.

Moore sketched the projected results of the conservation and renewable energy initiatives. Federal investment of $336 million over a decade will return cash savings of 95-to-1; energy consumption will drop by 14 percent of imported oil; 15 large power plants will not need to be built; and carbon and sulphur dioxide emissions will decrease.

Moore began the first program under the initiative: sending out efficiency teams of lighting specialists to "help get the federal house in order." "I want to introduce to you the first member of our efficiency teams—Charlie Jones, a career electrician for the Forrestal building."

A middle-aged, somewhat shy man in tan coveralls with an oval name patch sewn on the chest came in with an assistant, a ladder, and a set of hand tools. He opened a fluorescent ceiling fixture. As efficiency specialist Jones began wiring in a new solid state ballast (the voltage-boosting transformer that drives fluorescent tubes), Moore explained that each device would save taxpayers six dollars per year.

It may sound ridiculous, but there I sat, watching this dog-and-pony show, contemplating the possibility that DOE after a decade of neglect might begin to do something to benefit the country and improve the health of the planet, and tears were coming to my eyes.

After a year on the job, DOE Secretary James D. Watkins shows some promise of solving the perennial executive branch conundrum: Can we find agency leaders who have enough inside knowledge and power to get things done, yet can be trusted to act in the national interest? If Watkins fulfills this promise at Energy, it won't be a minute too soon—America has no more of a coherent energy policy today than it did when DOE was established; conservation has been mostly for volunteers and small entrepreneurs; a significant amount of money is still being put into nuclear power plants that aren't producing a kilowatt,

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while our air and water are threatened by nuclear waste; in the meantime, DOE has spent more and more of its time and money not on creative approaches to this mess but on . . . making nuclear bombs. So the idea that DOE may be turning towards such essentials as energy conservation is a radical shift—one that should be encouraged at every turn.

Bomb America first

One mid-January afternoon I waited in a reception area in DOE's Forrestal Building to interview Linda Stuntz, deputy undersecretary in charge of the Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis. Watkins has called Stuntz his "right-hand person for strategy development," and during the past year she has organized a series of public "energy strategy hearings" around the country.

A prominent photo on the wall gives a candid statement of DOE's real business. It shows a tranquil desert scene—at the Nevada Test Site, where the U.S. explodes nuclear bombs underground. Most tests are conducted under the desert floor, in shafts up to 10 feet in diameter and 6,000 feet deep. Drilling, lowering the bomb and instruments into the hole, and filling it with concrete, epoxy, and gravel takes up to two years, at an average cost of at least $30 million.

About once each month, another test bomb is exploded, and within a few days a subsidence crater up to a thousand feet in diameter appears on the surface. Even during a test, the site looks as peaceful as the scene on the wall.

It's no wonder there are nuclear test site pictures in these offices. There probably ought to be a mushroom cloud on the department letterhead. After all, during Reagan's tenure, the share of DOE's budget devoted to designing, testing, and manufacturing nuclear weapons *increased from 32 to nearly 70 percent.*

The uninitiated may be excused for asking, "What is the *Energy* Department doing in the nuclear bomb business?"

DOE's first secretary was James R. Schlesinger, previously head of the CIA, and later secretary of defense. In all three positions, he was a member of the nuclear inner circle.

Charles Duncan was the second secretary, appointed by President Carter in 1979 and the last to try steering DOE toward its stated mission. His lack of military background kept him from influencing weapons policy, and he soon made enemies in the established energy industries. According to Tina Hobson, who served as a senior executive at DOE under the first four secretaries, "Duncan said, 'During my tenure at DOE, conservation will play the lead role.' He tried to make that happen, and he was dynamited by everybody."

The noble-sounding purposes of the nuclear weapons clique put mundane items such as the environment in the deep shade. Secrecy prevented outside oversight or regulation, while internal supervision of the contractors, who constituted 90 percent of DOE's workforce, was lax at best.

The department's budget diagram is full of euphemisms. "Strengthening National Defense" is set at $9.2 billion—with $8.5 billion for nuclear weapons. On the other side is $3.3 billion, called "Respecting the Environment." It's devoted to weapons plant cleanup.

Schlesinger's attitude fit this ethos to a T; according to Hobson, with him it was, "If you just leave me alone, I will take care of the problem. Don't ask me any questions, don't hold me accountable, don't do anything else, just believe in me."

Later on, that kind of faith came easily to Ronald Reagan, who had been a TV pitchman for General Electric, one of DOE's largest weapons contractors. His disdain for regulation, especially environmental regulation, was matched only by his absolute trust in business.

During his 1980 presidential campaign, Reagan singled out DOE as a prime example of government waste and promised to abolish the department. In the words of Deputy Undersecretary Stuntz: "That didn't exactly set the tone for the agency to feel that it had a mission and a future." Yet DOE's budget has stayed roughly constant in real terms since 1980. According to Hobson, this is why: "We knew that Reagan's campaign did not fully realize that the weapons system was a major part of DOE."

After the Reaganauts wised up, the 1980s saw the steady, quiet diversion of DOE even further from its stated purpose. Its weapons branch had long been the most powerful, not to mention the most immune to public scrutiny. Now falling oil prices, combined with Reagan's massive diversion of funds into the

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military, accelerated the weapons takeover of DOE. By 1988, more than twice as much money was going into weapons as into the rest of DOE programs combined.

Through the late 1980s, public outrage over the plants increased as the scale of abuse was gradually exposed. At the Fernald, Ohio weapons plant, more than half a million pounds of radioactive wastes had been dumped into the air and into Ohio's largest drinking water aquifer. During the fifties, radioactive iodine had been deliberately released from the Hanford plant. High-level nuclear waste still leaks out of storage tanks there. Similar stories come from Savannah River, where serious accidents and pollutant releases that began in 1957 were finally made public in 1988. At all of the facilities, health and safety practices were poor, and many records were altered or destroyed. With the recent indications that there is an appreciable cancer danger even from the exposure to radiation that comes merely from being an airline passenger, the long-range health risks of government's decades of blatant nuclear mismanagement cannot be shrugged off.

Tiger teams at Rocky Flats

Because of the scale of the problems Watkins faces and the independent thinking he brings to his job, he's been compared to Gorbachev. Like Gorbachev's, his vision may be limited by his having risen through a secret society—the very path that makes him so effective. Watkins was handpicked by Hyman Rickover for the elite corps of Navy nuclear engineers, so he is a longtime member of what amounts to an officially sanctioned secret cult. Finally, Watkins resembles Gorbachev in that his actions may have consequences far beyond his intentions.

DOE critics saw cause for hope in Watkins's performance as head of Reagan's AIDS Commission. His integrity and sense of justice were well known, but Watkins surprised nearly everyone with his candor, compassion, and creativity. And he abstained from moralizing, even though he is a staunch conservative and a devout Catholic.

One of Watkins's first projects at Energy was the use of "Tiger Teams" of nuclear facility experts, who invaded the weapons plants one by one, sometimes with little or no warning. After 40 years of classified operation, this was a much-needed innovation. Tiger Team reports may be expected to whitewash here and there, but each team is, when possible, composed of people with no direct connection to the plant under investigation. Although their reports on environmental, health, and safety practices are written in euphemistic bureaucratese, they confirm that violations were serious and systematic. The findings have torn holes in the already frayed secrecy curtains that had hidden Rocky Flats, Fernald, Savannah River, Hanford, and a dozen others from view. As a result, several plants, or major sections of plants, have shut down and will never restart.

Techno sop

For years DOE has argued that it is not subject to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and it has been free from compliance with the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The "acceptable standards" it has set for itself for air and water pollution have been many times higher than levels that apply elsewhere. And the wording of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act covers all private and state manufacturing but exempts federal facilities. All these exceptions may fall soon. Watkins has repeatedly said that the environment, health, and safety will be top priorities at the weapons plants. But some warning signals come from one of Watkins's official alliances: The secretary stands behind Victor Stello, Bush's nominee for assistant secretary of defense programs, who has been under heavy fire from environmental groups for his sloppy, and possibly criminal, management of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Watkins is not likely to abuse his power for personal gain, but he still deserves oversight, skepticism, and frequent reality checks. If he makes mistakes, they're most likely to stem from his excessive faith in advanced technology. As an admiral, he pushed for Aegis, an expensive, badly flawed, and probably unfixable naval weapons system. He was also an early backer of SDI.

Watkins's support of Aegis and SDI is not an irrelevant curiosity from his recent past. It shows an affinity for the expensive pipe dreams of contractors—a hazard Energy must navigate around. After all, AT&T, GE, Westinghouse, Martin Marietta, and Goodyear are contractors at DOE's weapons plants.

Watkins's version of perestroika is to change what he calls the "management culture" of the weapons plants. On January 24, 1990, the secretary dropped another bomb on them. He announced a proposal to amend DOE acquisition regulations to make weapons contractors accountable for losses of government property from theft or embezzlement and for all penalties for not complying with environmental laws. Imagine that! These new rules on liability are a bold expression of Watkins's ethical sense, and they are significant in what they reveal about the past.

Even if Watkins is adamantly committed to nuclear weapons development, he seems willing to clear

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away some of the underbrush of corruption, secrecy, and environmental abuses, then let the public decide on the merits whether to continue pouring tens of billions into bomb development. The answer should be a firm "No" (see "Bombs are not Bright . . . ," below).

Without much fanfare, in recent months Watkins, Moore, and Stuntz have held hearings around the country on the National Energy Strategy. Each hearing is an all-day affair, often on a locally pertinent topic.

At these affairs, Watkins usually gives a short opening remark, and he often attends the entire hearing. The secretary says he has heard repeatedly that what people want and believe in is conservation and renewable energy. He is impressed with what he has heard about innovative projects that communities and firms have undertaken, often with little or no support from the federal government: one favorite is a cow-manure-to-energy plant in El Centro, California. He closes his three-minute talk with thanks "for your willingness to assist us in this effort to devise a National Energy Strategy without insult to the environment."

Three days after I watched Deputy Secretary Moore kick off DOE's efficiency and conservation initiative, the administration's 1991 Energy budget request was released to a full auditorium of reporters.

But the budget document was a letdown for those who had heard Watkins and Moore say, "Any budget that doesn't make conservation and renewables a top priority won't be credible to Congress, and it won't be credible to the American people."

Despite such explicit statements, here was a request to cut the 1990 conservation budget by 5 percent. Renewables did better, with a 25 percent increase—about 4 percent of the journey back to pre-Reagan levels.

Bombs are not Bright . . .

"Deterrence" is a much-abused buzzword, employed to justify any and every weapon invented since 1945. We have a bewildering array of warheads, delivery systems, and acronyms, each faster, more efficient, and more accurate than the last, and each absolutely essential to deterrence. Most citizens naturally leave it to "the experts" to define and implement strategy.

How many one-megaton bombs (each 50 times as powerful as Hiroshima) would constitute a reliable deterrent? Former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, hardly a dove, estimated that 400 would be more than enough—no matter how big the enemy's arsenal. Ten percent, in other words, of what the U.S. and the Soviet Union each stockpile.

Not only are thousands of superfluous warheads strategically meaningless, but larger stockpiles are more expensive and environmentally damaging to maintain and more susceptible to accident and misuse. Even the cost of maintaining an oversized deterrent force is dwarfed by what we now spend to continually develop new bombs and to support the arms race that the new weapons stimulate.

Perhaps it is time for an honest policy review.

A logical place to start would be at the tenacious roots of the system: under the desert floor in the beautiful photo in Linda Stuntz's outer office. Why do we add a new crater, costing tens of millions of dollars, to the Nevada desert each month? To find out, I reviewed statements put out since 1987 by three of nuclear testing's strongest advocates: the State Department, the Pentagon, and DOE. The justifications come in four flavors:

Improve safety and security—This refers to devices that "prevent accidental detonation or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons" (by terrorists, for example). A worthy and peaceable endeavor, but exploding actual bombs has nothing to do with it. Devices that prevent conventional trigger explosives from being detonated can be tested with dummy plutonium in place or through nonexplosive component tests.

Ensure survivability—This rationale applies to tests of weapons' effects on military hardware. But simulations have been developed to mimic all the major effects of nuclear explosions. Besides, a weapon's capability to survive is desirable primarily if one plans to fight a protracted nuclear war, something that even Ronald Reagan has characterized as "unwinnable." About two tests each year are performed for this purpose.

Maintain reliability—Occasionally, the stockpile is sampled to make sure bombs will explode

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The department's budget pie-diagram is full of new euphemisms. "Strengthening National Defense" is set at $9.2 billion—with $8.5 billion for nuclear weapons—up 11 percent from 1990. On the other side of the pie is a $3.3 billion slice called "Respecting the Environment." "Apologizing to the Environment" would be more accurate—it's devoted to weapons plant cleanup and defense nuclear waste disposal—that's a pretty low payment on a bill expected to exceed $100 billion.

It's hard to reconcile the budget with the rhetoric. But the budget probably doesn't reflect Watkins's priorities; others in the administration—notably White House Chief of Staff John Sununu and OMB Director Richard Darman—had a hand in it. (When Watkins mentioned an "ideological difference" in the administration over conservation, efficiency, and renewables, he sounded like a man sending out a coded message.) Fortunately, at DOE—unlike at the other departments where the spending hasn't matched the rhethoric—the right words ("efficiency," "conservation," "alternatives") can go a long way after so many years of silence.

Lean, mean, and clean

Since 1973, efficiency gains in energy consumption have saved us about $1.5 trillion in energy bills. Efficiency and conservation meant that while the economy grew by 50 percent, the number of homes increased by 20 million, and 60 percent more vehicles went on the road, energy consumption grew by only 8 percent.

Nice numbers, but so what? So we're all wealthier

BOMBS, from page 41

as advertised. This rationale has an Alice-in-Wonderland quality, but it is trotted out regularly. By now we have a good handle on bomb shelf life, and new components can be manufactured using the original blueprints. Supposedly, ". . . testing enabled the U.S. to correct problems with the warhead on the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile that, if left uncorrected, could have neutralized our sea-based deterrent." But if we hadn't tested, we couldn't have known and neither could the Soviets. A deterrent works not because all bombs are 100 percent reliable, but because an opponent can't be certain that they are *not* reliable. So between the time the problem was identified and when it was corrected, our deterrent may have been weaker, but it was *testing* that made it that way. That only 3 percent of tests are for this purpose is a clue to its importance.

Modernization—Now we're getting to the nub: catching up with the Soviets. Or is it catching up with where the Soviets might be five years from now if we didn't keep running ahead of them? Something like that.

To support this rationale, it is necessary to acknowledge that the Soviets are behind us in warhead design and to assert that if we both stopped they could suddenly restart and leap ahead of us; at the same time, it is necessary to claim that older weapons are more threatening than new ones but that modernization (by the Soviets) is even *more* threatening than if they lag behind. Keeping all these arguments in the air at the same time is a difficult juggling act, but Energy PR people give it their best. A June 1989 brochure, "Why Do We Need Nuclear Testing?", is a doublespeak classic worth quoting at length. Titled "U.S. Testing Need Greater," it says:

> The testing of nuclear weapons is more important to the United States than to the Soviet Union. Based on available evidence, the U.S. relies more on high technology and on optimized warhead characteristics in its nuclear warhead designs. Additional testing limitations would allow the Soviets to fall back on previously tested, heavier, higher yield and relatively simpler warhead designs.

So because we've gained more from testing, it is imperative that we test even *more*. Our newer designs are better, but if the Soviets could "fall back" on the more primitive bombs that they've already tested, they would get ahead of us (so what prevents them from doing that now?). The above paragraph sounds like an argument for a U.S. unilateral moratorium so that the Soviets can surge ahead until they get behind us, while we fall back to the weapons that will put us ahead of them again.

What have we gained from all this modernization? Mainly more compact and efficient bombs. Bombs that can be put on missiles 8 or 10 at a

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and freer than we would have been. The U.S. is dumping five billion tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere each year, rather than seven billion. Due largely to efficiency gains made during the preceding decade, the past five years were a respite from energy anxiety. This would have been a good time to invest in even better technology; instead, it was a time of missed opportunity.

Here's a story that illustrates DOE's role: In 1978, Congress directed Energy to set home appliance efficiency standards. A few days before Reagan's 1981 inauguration, the agency issued standards on nine appliance types. The first set of standards are just now going into effect, and they are so weak that many appliances on the market already satisfy them.

Why did the government take longer to prod onto the market a few basic devices that will save consumers energy and money than it did to put a man on the moon? DOE's intransigence deserves most of the blame, but the format of the standards mandated by Congress hasn't helped much. Under this format, manufacturers feel that they can only lose. The regulations will set minimum efficiency levels, but manufacturers won't be rewarded for exceeding them. And if they don't meet the standards, enforcement and the levels of fines are unpredictable.

A better policy would be to tax (or subsidize) each appliance by the amount of energy it will waste (or save) during, say, three years, compared to the current average model. People would be free to buy or sell whatever they wanted, and we would see rapid progress toward the practical limits of efficiency.

Several energy-saving devices have come straight from DOE labs. The solid-state ballast so admired by

time. Bombs that fit inside six-inch artillery shells. Bombs that a terrorist could put in a knapsack or smuggle across the border inside a bale of marijuana. Bombs that clearly threaten stability, arms control, and security.

Testing undermines deterrence because a measure of unreliability enhances stability "from both ends." If we know that the Soviets can't have full confidence in their entire arsenal, a first strike is less plausible. This makes us less likely to take a hair-trigger, launch-on-warning stance during a crisis.

If testing doesn't promote deterrence, then what is it for? There are two plausible answers: First, we could be striving for first-strike capability. Not likely, assuming our strategic planners have the rudiments of sanity. More probable is that nuclear testing is a key driver of the arms race, worth tens of billions of dollars to contractors for warhead production alone.

The latest round of weapons development from DOE emphasizes "directed energy" weapons and earth-penetrating warheads. The feature these have in common is that they are not designed for efficient slaughter of humans: there's no need to focus emitted radiation for that job, or to have high accuracy; nor do many people live underground.

Used by us, the new weapons would be called a "counterforce attack"; used by the Soviets, the more familiar "first strike" would apply. Because they are designed to destroy missiles, these weapons are of little deterrent value (unless they are launched first, the silos and subs they are aimed at will be empty). Worse yet, if we possess such "third generation" missiles, and the Soviets believe that an attack may be occurring, they are presented with a choice: "Use 'em or lose 'em." This is precisely the opposite of deterrence.

James Watkins's religious devotion to weapons has produced at least one contradiction. He considers the hardening of command and control facilities the most important recent advance in deterrence. Yet he supports DOE's testing program. One of the main goals of that program is development of weapons capable of destroying hardened command posts.

If the public has a chance to talk with Watkins about nuclear testing, we may want to ask him why we can't do without it while the Soviets can. Certainly not because they are comfortably "ahead" of us. Not when they've tested 641 bombs to our 942. They also stopped testing unilaterally for 19 months in 1985-87 and repeatedly asked us to join their moratorium. Due to citizen protests, testing at the main Soviet site has been suspended since last fall and probably won't restart until a new site in the Arctic becomes operational, if ever.

On February 1, 1990, an appeal from the Soviet parliament in favor of a comprehensive test ban was read into the *Congressional Record* by Senator Mitchell. For the nth time, the USSR has said it will end testing if we will. Perhaps we should give that offer serious consideration. There are other things we could do with $10 billion a year.

—*P.G.*

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Deputy Secretary Moore is quietly "mining coal" at rates far beyond the R&D money spent on it. Low-emissivity glass also came out of government labs, and it can reduce energy loss to a point where windows rival insulated walls. These are among many DOE research projects that will eventually save hundreds or even thousands of times the money spent on them.

How much more can we squeeze out of efficiency, and what will it cost? One hint comes from the many industrialized democracies that are up to twice as energy efficient in various economic sectors as we are. Economic advancement is strongly correlated with lower, not higher, energy intensity (consumption per GNP dollar).

At the January 26 press conference, I asked Moore whether DOE expects attacks from the coal, oil, and nuclear industries, and how he plans to respond. He didn't expect to be attacked: "Conservation doesn't conflict with other energy sources, but complements them. We hope they will see the wisdom in this approach." But efficiency doesn't complement other energy sources, it *replaces* them—especially when the survival of an industry depends on demand increases to justify massive funding. Efficiency was a main reason nuclear reactor orders ceased in 1978.

I asked about fluorescent ballasts. How much do they cost? How will you get building contractors to buy them? Moore expressed confidence in the market to put all things right. It's only a matter of setting a good example, he said; give people information, and they will naturally buy the most efficient and environmentally benign products. Perhaps, but don't count on it.

Gone fission

The political key to positive energy policy is a willingness to divide the savings among all participants. For example, utilities can be powerful promoters of rational energy production and use, but in their natural cost-plus rate-setting habitat, conservation

. . . Bulbs are

Can you do the planet and yourself a favor through energy efficiency? Consider compact fluorescent lightbulbs. They've been on the market since the early '80s and have the following features: They are self-contained and screw into existing incandescent sockets; they produce essentially the same light as standard bulbs, without hum or flicker; they consume 75 percent less energy; and they last 10 times longer. Over their lifetimes such bulbs can cut lighting costs in half.

Let's look at lightbulbs from some other angles. Each compact fluorescent that replaces a standard 75 watt incandescent will save about $5 per year. What if we retrofitted half of the country's three billion bulbs? They would replace 20 1,000-megawatt power plants. Savings would exceed $7 billion annually —enough to pay almost half of DOE's entire budget.

More to the point, the entire combined R&D budget for efficiency, conservation, and renewable energy, at the 1989 level, could be funded for 25 years from each year's savings. Talk about highly leveraged investments!

So why haven't you seen these items at the local supermarket, or perhaps even heard of them? Well, I've known about them for six months, I've done the calculations, and I am convinced they would help me do well and do good at the same time . . . yet I don't have a single one in my house. Why not?

First, they may be on the market but they aren't on the shelf. After spending hours on the phone to several lightbulb manufacturers, I was able to find one employee who confirmed that the company makes compact fluorescents, but no one could tell me if or where they may be sold in the D.C. area.

The catch is, I'm lazy and shortsighted. Like most people, I won't bother to search out such a minor item, and I'm content to leave money in places where it earns 4-to-5 percent, instead of putting it where it could generate a 100 percent real rate of return.

Still, I had a story to write about lightbulbs, so I finally tracked down one source, Seventh Generation, a small environmentally conscious products outlet in South Burlington, Vermont. Friendly on the phone, but with a somewhat, well . . . laid-back attitude.

Six weeks after I called, they sent me their catalog. Printed on recycled paper, of course, and with yupscale prices. Catalog hype for the compact fluorescents is ambitious. The bulbs pay for themselves in six months, and by investing in 10 of them you can receive "a guaranteed return of

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and renewables are an anathema. The alternative approach could be made consistently profitable, and extended to conservation programs (see ". . . Bulbs are," below).

There is disagreement among atmospheric scientists over how far and how fast global warming will progress but little controversy over whether it will happen. We have begun a global experiment that we cannot expect to back out of.

While we wait for a clearer picture of the effects of global warming, common sense and prudence suggest that in dealing with it we take the cheapest steps immediately. We can devise incentives to decrease energy consumption and to shift toward low-carbon fuels. A tax on fuels in proportion to their carbon content will put the incentives where they belong. If increased gradually over 10 to 20 years, a carbon tax will stimulate innovation just as OPEC did, but without causing economic dislocation. Among the side benefits will be improved energy security and cuts in other pollutants. The U.S. does not need to fear sacrificing its economy with a unilateral carbon tax; ample proof of cooperation can be seen in agreements such as the Montreal Protocol on ozone-destroying chemicals, and most industrial nations already tax their fuels heavily.

An emissions tax deserves to be called a "user fee," not to disguise what it is but to emphasize that it is a charge for using the public atmosphere as a waste dump. Taxing carbon consumption will promote efficiency, the best bridge toward sustainable energy use.

Global warming may also be the last chance to save fission (uranium-based) power. Despite its long string of broken promises, nuclear may someday be part of the answer, and it may deserve further R&D funding. But taxpayers should insist on a package deal: 1) responsible and vigorous oversight every step of the way; 2) up-front accounting of the risks and costs of waste disposal and plant decommissioning; 3) reactor operators must buy their own liability insurance instead of shifting this burden to the public as they do now; and 4) DOE must guarantee that nu-

$408 a year." Not unless you keep all those lights on 25 hours a day.

A drawback to the new bulbs is that they are more bulky; some fixtures won't hold them. That's why I propose replacing only half our incandescents; updating millions of fixtures will take decades. On the other hand, fluorescents produce so much less heat that they'll need less ventilation room, and they'll reduce air-conditioning costs.

I finally ordered three of them, but—this brings me to the second reason it took so long—they cost $18 a pop! $160 for a set of 10. And who wants to mail-order lightbulbs? I don't get to see and heft one before purchase, and I'll have to wait six weeks for delivery. And *then* it will take several years to break even. It's easy enough to put all that off for a few more days.

Armed with better information, I tried again to find local sources of wonder bulbs. This exercise is recommended as a way to observe market barriers in action. The three major manufacturers are Philips, GE, and Osram. I sat on hold, waiting to find someone who had even heard of the devices. Finally, I compiled a list of six sources in the Washington metropolitan area. All of them are wholesalers in out-of-the-way industrial locations. Prices run $24 and up, and they often have to be special ordered. Now it makes sense to mail order lightbulbs!

Actually, I'm not so lazy or shortsighted; what I am is literal-minded. I know what the lightbulbs cost, but the electric bill will never tell me how much I'm saving with fancy bulbs. This is a real problem, one that DOE's Office of Conservation and Renewable Energy should take seriously.

Why not split the savings with electric utilities by letting them finance the hardware? For example:

1) The utility sends you a pamphlet showing how the new bulbs can save energy and money.

2) You buy 10 bulbs at $15 each and send the receipt in with your next utility bill.

3) The utility sends you a check for $150, loaned for four years at 10 percent interest. (That interest, combined with their ability to forgo building new plants, sweetens the deal for the utilities.)

4) Your monthly loan payments, added to the light bill, are $3.98. But at a typical 35-bulb-hours per day, you save $4.86 worth of power, so your monthly bill drops by $0.88 for four years, then by $4.86 for the next six years. Plus you'll have 10 times less bother with buying, stocking, and changing lightbulbs.

—*P.G.*

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clear power *will not* be used as a source of weapon material.

Since 1973, efficiency has displaced seven times as much energy as new nuclear reactors have supplied, at costs five to ten times lower. In the near term, efficiency clearly wins as a fossil fuel replacer, because even a sudden surge in orders couldn't bring any new plants on line before the end of the decade, under the most optimistic assumptions. For the longer run, we have other options to consider.

Ninety percent of the world's wind power (enough for 350,000 households) is generated in California, not because the resource is so good, but because energy policy there was originally favorable. The average electricity harvest tops $2,000 per acre, five times the yield of prime midwestern corn land—and wind farms are also used for ranching.

Solar-thermal electric power is available *right now* to 400,000 people in Southern California at costs converging on the U.S. average residential rate.

One of the nuclear lobby's counterarguments to this trend is that solar would use many times the land area required by the equivalent in nuclear. But this is specious: Nuclear plants require large quantities of water for cooling and tend to be located on valuable riverbank or coastal land, whereas solar plants can use desert land and can also take advantage of millions of rooftops.

One more visit to DOE's desert photo: Using currently operating solar technology, DOE's Nevada Test Site could replace 70 typical nuclear power plants.

Power lines

DOE's progress could eventually lead to something resembling "rational energy policy." What would such policy look like, and why do we want it?

Rational policy must be capable of estimating the full range of foreseeable costs and benefits from every known energy source. Linda Stuntz points out that no source of energy is entirely without negative side effects. She cites the example of wind turbines, which she says are killing several dozen eagles per year in California. Actually, it's mostly hawks, but fair is fair; those costs should be taken into account. Yet we should be wary of this approach being used as a ploy to say, "All fuels cause some environmental damage, and we can't precisely measure any of it, so let's assume those effects are equal, and ignore all of them." After all, we can make distinctions: Switching to nuclear power would cause immense quantities of plutonium to circulate throughout the country; we should acknowledge the health and weapons proliferation implications.

The words "Energy Policy" arouse fears—especially among those who make their livings from fossil and nuclear fuels—that established energy producers will be robbed in order to subsidize alternative sources unfairly. This attitude is epitomized in a statement that justified an 85 percent reduction in government funding for renewables:

> "Conservation and renewable energy sources are an important component of this administration's national energy policy. We support efforts *by the private sector* to develop alternative energy sources that are economically viable in the nation's competitive marketplace." (Emphasis added.)
>
> —Ronald Reagan, April 16, 1985

The problem is that the nation's energy market is far from competitive. Department of Energy R&D funding for renewables in 1990 is 8 percent of the total for nuclear and fossil. Altogether, including loan guarantees, tax breaks, and other subsidies, nuclear and fossil receive $40-50 billion per year from taxpayers. Meanwhile, estimates of environmental damage from fossil fuels are in the $100-billion-per-year range; not adding these costs to energy prices is an unjustifiable subsidy. A rational energy policy would level the playing field by making prices reflect environmental costs.

On the other hand, there are huge potential markets for wind and solar energy, and they could provide a way for the U.S. to reduce its deficits and enjoy the benefits of being an energy exporter. Even though Japan and Germany have less than ideal conditions for collecting solar energy at home, they have been funding photovoltaic research at twice the American rate. They tend to know a profitable opportunity when they see one.

But few of these great things are likely to be done through DOE as long as the department is dominated by business-as-usual weapons production. Contractors probably won't get out of bomb building and into sustainable energy as long as they eat at the lavish trough provided through protection from scrutiny. Here's where Watkins's amalgam of inside knowledge and high ethical standards could change the basic rules.

Watkins has made several moves that, intentionally or not, are likely to start winding down DOE's weapons complex. If contractors are liable for damages they cause while working with some of the most hazardous substances known and are subject to the political risk of an end to the Cold War, many may decide to take their interest elsewhere. This could eventually put the Energy department back in the energy business. □

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➡ Months *before* the Iran-Contra scandal broke in newspapers, we warned readers, "This National Security Council staff is the worst in history."

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WHO'S WHO

Fred Barnes of *The New Republic* has confirmed the report in last month's "Who's Who" that **Richard Darman** is **John Sununu**'s ally against **William Reilly** of the EPA. Barnes added a detail we hadn't known about the preparation of **George Bush**'s speech on the environment to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. It seems that the final draft of the speech was edited by Darman and Sununu at a dinner party at Vice President **Dan Quayle**'s Naval Observatory residence.

Another fact Barnes notes—that Darman and Sununu are so "arrogant and intimidating" that "few challenge them" in policy discussion within the administration—has become a matter of serious concern among veteran Washington observers. They cite Sununu's recent dismissal on NBC of those who oppose him on environmental issues as "fifth-level bureaucrats at EPA" and *The New York Times* report that "the career budget analysts who work under Mr. Darman . . . say he is contemptuous of them and their work and derides them in public" as evidence that Sununu and Darman scorn the government employee who is in a position to give them the kind of facts they need to make wise policy.

Concern about Darman's arrogance is especially high. Governor **Richard Celeste** of Ohio recently wrote Darman complaining that at a meeting in Washington "you repeatedly belittled thoughtful points made by Governors **Clinton** and **Campbell,** and especially by Admiral **Watkins**" and "cavalierly" dismissed the need for American students to learn a foreign language with expressions like "who needs to know another Chinese dialect?" . . .

When **Jim Lehrer,** during the McNeil-Lehrer News Hour of March 8, asked **Samuel Skinner,** the secretary of transportation, how he would characterize the department's new policy that had been unveiled that day, Skinner modestly replied, "Bold." The secretary then proceeded to reveal that his handlers had not briefed him well on his interviewer. Lehrer asked him about the administration's policy on buses, and Skinner, looking pained that anyone would bother him about such trivia, quickly dismissed the subject. Lehrer just happens to come from a family in the bus business and is such a devotee of the vehicle that he even owns one himself. He does not regard the subject as trivial.

Skinner, by the way, was recently nailed by **Jack Anderson** for using the department's Gulfstream G-IV jet so much that it has been unavailable for its supposed primary use, the training of government flight safety inspectors. Because the plane wasn't available, the inspectors have had to be granted waivers of the training requirements.

Observers are curious as to why the plane, if its primary purpose *is* training, is equipped with plush carpeting, lounge chairs, private telephones, a bar, a stereo, and a television with a VCR. . . .

A few months ago we asked how a Democrat could have influence in a Republican administration and explained that **John Robson,** the deputy secretary of the Treasury, was a former protege of **Joseph Califano.** Subsequently, we have learned of another of Califano's boys who has attained high rank in the Bush administration—**Robert Zoellick,** who as counselor to Secretary of State **James Baker** is second in influence over his boss only to **Margaret Tutwiler.** . . .

Robson, by the way, has been Treasury's point man on the S&L bailout, and the experience has thus far not added luster to his reputation. In fact, the bailout is, according to one administration source, "blowing up in our face. It's one of those things that's so bad that nobody wants to talk about it." As we were going to press, **Timothy Ryan** was said to be slated to replace **Salvatore Martoche,** who had just been named the temporary successor of the infamous **M. Danny Wall,** who resigned in December but was still serving because Robson couldn't find a replacement. . . .

The CIA's disagreement with the Pentagon over the Russian threat has become widely known because **William Webster** and **Dick Cheney** have gone public with it. Much less well known is the agency's disagreement with State about the Japanese, whom State still regards as benign and who the CIA suspects are out to kill us economically. . . .

In—*Defense:* Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs—**Enrique Mendez Jr.** Assistant Secretary for Production and Logistics—**Colin Riley McMillan.** *Energy:* Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy—**Robert H. Gentile.** *Justice:* Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights—**John R. Dunne.** *Agencies and Commissions:* Chairman, U.S. Civil Rights Commission—**Arthur A. Fletcher.** Chairman, Postal Rate Commission—**George W. Haley.**

Out—*Energy:* Assistant Secretary for Management and Administration—**Donna Fitzpatrick.** *Agencies and Commissions:* Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration—**John C. Lawn.**

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ON POLITICAL BOOKS

Pray TV

Religious television is here to stay, so let's get it right

by Henry G. Brinton

In the spring of 1986, PTL needed cash desperately. The television ministry had built up an $8.4 million debt to the builder of its Christian amusement park, Heritage USA. Jim Bakker figured that he needed to do something fast, so he decided to hold a telethon to raise at least $1 million for the builder. He made this decision on a feeling, a feeling of faith.

"Well, Lord, I know I felt faith," said Bakker to God and then to his studio audience. He explained to his followers that the Lord seemed to speak in his heart, saying, "Well, you're on television all day; just mention it to the satellite people, the need, and do the special that you were doing with the studio audience all week long, to be able to raise that million dollars."

The special offer was a steal: for $1,000, Bakker offered his viewers a package of lodging and free recreation that had once cost $3,000. PTL's audience grabbed at the deal and contributed $16.6 million in just 12 days. There was only one problem, and it had religious overtones: There was no room at the inn. Jim Bakker is now serving a prison sentence for fraud.

What is it about television that allows, or perhaps even encourages, a television minister like Jim Bakker to succeed? In *Forgiven,** Charles Shepard describes Bakker's appeal, revealing his gift "for making his TV audience feel what he felt—or seemed to be feeling."

Bakker was not the first religious leader to tap the power of television, and he will not be the last. Fulton Sheen and Martin Luther King used TV well before Bakker, and both Pat Robertson and Jesse Jackson are trying to reach out through the medium today. But Robertson and Jackson will probably fail, despite their charisma. They may share Bakker's ability to grab viewers emotionally, but their messages come from extremes in the Judeo-Christian tradition: Robertson most recalls Abraham, emphasizing the obligations religion imposes on its believers, while Jackson seems determined to be a modern Moses, emphasizing the liberation it promises them.

Both obligation and liberation are essential elements of religious life, but neither should be emphasized at the expense of the other. Unless a television minister comes along who can see the value of being both an Abraham and a Moses, religious leaders on TV will continue to be viewed by most Americans as extremists, charlatans, or fools.

Preacher features

It wasn't always this way. After 20 years of broadcasting the "Catholic Hour" over radio, Bishop Fulton Sheen broke into television in the early 1950s with his series "Life is Worth Living." The title of the program captured the optimism of the fifties perfectly: Life *was* worth living, especially for Americans in a time of unparalleled prosperity. Sheen's talks on subjects such as war, Stalin, psychiatry, and God's sense of humor were extremely popular, and his show won an Emmy in 1952. Catholics, Protestants, Jews, and many nonreligious people watched the show; at its peak it was carried by ABC on 170 stations in the U.S. and 17 in Canada. If the Roman

Henry G. Brinton is the pastor of Calvary Presbyterian Church in Alexandria, Virginia.

**Forgiven: The Rise and Fall of Jim Bakker and the PTL Ministry.* Charles E. Shepard. *Atlantic Monthly Press, $22.95.*

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Catholic Church had not become nervous about the bishop's celebrity status and pulled him off the air in 1957, he might have continued broadcasting through the sixties.

Catholics were not alone in being suspicious of the power of television. The Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr felt that TV was nothing less than a peril to culture. After viewing Nixon's Checkers speech, he wrote that the vice-presidential candidate's "tear-jerking account of his personal history, involving his devoted wife, charming children, and even the family dog [was a] great show," but "what becomes of every rule of logic and reason in the proceedings?"

When Billy Graham's crusade came to New York in 1957, Reinhold Niebuhr became angry. All the "high-pressure techniques of modern salesmanship" and the "arts of the Madison Avenue crowd" were pressed into service, according to Niebuhr, who described Graham's evangelism as having "a blandness which befits the Eisenhower era." The alliance between revivalism and Madison Avenue troubled Niebuhr, because he saw popular religion beginning to copy the secular world's frantic pursuit of success.

Martin Luther King Jr. used television well, making the most of network coverage as he fought for civil rights through civil disobedience. After the Montgomery bus boycott of 1955-56, King was the second black ever to appear on NBC's "Meet the Press." By the time of the 1963 March on Washington, King was a celebrity. All three networks covered his "I Have a Dream" speech live at the Lincoln Memorial, giving President Kennedy and millions of Americans their first chance to witness an entire King address. "He's damn good," remarked the president to his aides.

After the assassinations of Kennedy and King, the turmoil of Vietnam and Watergate, and the headaches of oil crises and runaway inflation, religious messages on television went from optimistic dreams to pessimistic pronouncements. The televangelists rose to prominence by describing America as a country blessed by God but in danger of losing divine favor if it did not adhere to a Christian agenda. Abortion, homosexuality, AIDS, and "secular humanism" were all signs that the country was sliding downhill, making life look bleak to the born-again Christian community. But even if America did not turn itself around, most believers had an escape clause in their religious contracts: God's final triumph was near, and his faithful followers would be taken from the sinful world to a heavenly kingdom when the end arrived.

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

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All in all, the evangelical message fit the mood of the seventies and eighties: The world is a mess, but don't worry; you'll be saved if you believe in that old-time religion.

Among the most prominent of the televangelists were Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, Jimmy Swaggart, and Jim Bakker, men who differed markedly in style but who shared the same basic beliefs about God, country, and the end of the world. The story of Bakker's rise and fall reveals the ambitions of all four, since it was Robertson who gave Bakker his start in broadcasting on his "700 Club," Swaggart who worked to expose the Jessica Hahn affair and bring Bakker down, and Falwell who stepped in to take control of the collapsing empire.

Praying for Dollars

Forgiven is an exhaustive account of Bakker's life and career, containing details of his sexual activity with Jessica Hahn and a number of male PTL employees, revelations of his deceit and mismanagement, and stories of his incredible greed (he personally made $1.6 million at PTL in 1986). Charles Shepard, an investigative reporter whose work about PTL won a Pulitzer Prize for *The Charlotte Observer,* leaves you feeling that Jim and his wife Tammy were really much more corrupt than they were ever said to be in the press—hard to believe but true.

Shepard's most significant contributions are his insights into why the televangelist was so attractive to nearly a million followers. Bakker was never interested in ministerial duties such as teaching and counseling (he dropped out of Bible college after a year and a half); his real love was theater, and as early as high school he was fascinated by show business. During his early training on Robertson's "700 Club," he learned to speak to the common person, intentionally weeding big words out of his vocabulary. Bakker lived by his emotions, not his intellect, according to Shepard: "He used tears, humor, righteous anger, bruised self-pity, and gentle ministry to touch viewers in their living rooms." Unfortunately, his changing emotions were the tail that eventually wagged the PTL dog. When he was accused by a reporter of lying to his studio audience, Bakker said, "Sometimes I just get caught up in what feels true."

It is no big surprise that Bakker found success in television. He could perform well on-screen and broke down the distance between himself and his audience by building a set to resemble his living room and beginning his shows by walking out of the studio audience. As a manipulator of facts, he was a master: he could present PTL's affairs in the most favorable light possible, free from instant analysis by critical onlookers or tough questions from suspicious reporters. Shepard is right on target when he says that Bakker's program "testified to the power of one-sided television to shape public opinion."

By 1987, Jim Bakker's religious messages, based on simple, childlike trust in God, were being transmitted through 165 local stations covering 85 percent of the national TV market. One of the most popular tenets of Bakker's faith was "seed-faith giving": Give to God and you shall receive much more in return, for God wants his followers to have material success. This was part of the prosperity gospel that had troubled Reinhold Niebuhr so much in the fifties, but it was an idea just right for the acquisitive eighties.

Now that Jim Bakker is in prison and most of his fellow televangelists are struggling to stay in business, it is worthwhile to ask how Christians will use television to bring their message to the American people in the nineties. Clearly, the most constructive religious message for Americans is one that balances liberation and obligation. A message of obligation alone fosters narrow-mindedness and intolerance, while a call for pure liberation creates chaos and alienation. What is needed in the nineties is a television spokesperson for the full Judeo-Christian heritage. Despite the Bakkers and the Swaggarts, because of the obvious power of TV, sincere religion should not look askance at it: Religious messages are important enough to be seen and heard widely. It is not hard to imagine how religion could better channel this power: televised movie reviews with an emphasis on the religious messages found in contemporary films; "real life" stories showing work in church homeless shelters and ministries among the rural poor; talk shows that examine the spiritual challenges of modern life in a balanced way.

Unfortunately, most TV audiences do not get excited by people with moderate or mediating positions. Viewers want bold stances, passionate extremes, and strong visuals, not the nuances and paradoxes that make Judaism and Christianity so rich. It was hardly surprising that the schismatic black priest George Stallings chose "Donahue" to announce his recent break with the Roman Catholic Church. Saying specifically that he had chosen the show because of its national syndication, Stallings described his new African-American church and unveiled its official logo. Logo? Since when have churches needed logos?

The challenge, of course, will be for religious broadcasters to present shows with substance while retaining humility in a medium that glorifies shallowness and celebrity. It's a challenge worth meeting; television might be a peril to culture, but it's a part of modern culture that religion cannot ignore. □

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TIDBITS & OUTRAGES

AND DON'T FORGET DALLAS IN NOVEMBER
USA Today ran the following item: "Come to think of it, why wait until May to visit Memphis? April is the month the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated in the city."

I DON'T KNOW WHAT IT WAS DOCTOR, BUT YESTERDAY AT ABOUT TWO IN THE MORNING, MUFFIN ATE EVERY POTATO CHIP IN THE HOUSE AND THEN CALLED OUT FOR PIZZA.
According to a story in *The Atlanta Constitution,* veterinarians are treating a growing number of pets who've eaten their owners' drugs.

WELL, HE DID SAY HE HAD LOTS OF EXPERIENCE WITH CORRUPTION
In Chicago, the city's chief ethics watchdog resigned after only one month on the job, admitting that he was the target of an ethics probe in his home state of Louisiana.

HE SAID HE'D SUFFERED A PULLED G-STRING
An L.A. County sheriff's deputy who had applied for a disability pension was discovered doubling as a male exotic dancer.

INVASION OF THE BORDER SNATCHERS
A map in a fourth-grade science textbook published by Addison-Wesley depicts Oklahoma and Texas as one state, ditto for Arkansas and Mississippi, while lumping together Maryland, Delaware, and New Jersey. Despite these features, the map still manages to represent a total of 48 contiguous states by also listing some new ones. A "state" is added to the panhandle of Texas, one is inserted between Tennessee and North Carolina, another between Louisiana and Mississippi, and one is tacked on to western Kentucky. Also, Michigan's Upper Peninsula is shown as belonging to Wisconsin.

BEE THEIR

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Students in New York City public, private and parochial schools who won their district Speling Bee competitions will be honored by the Daily News and Borough Presidents in ceremonies taking place on the following dates:

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Getting the Shaft

Today's miners battle the same enemy their grandfathers did—the press release

by Thomas N. Bethell

Here's a quick current-events quiz: Recently the United Mine Workers (UMW) signed a contract with Pittston Coal after a bitter strike lasting nearly a year. Why did the miners strike? Choose one: a) they wanted more money; b) they were trying to protect job security and health-and-retirement benefits; c) they remembered the Ludlow Massacre of 1914.

If you chose a), you didn't follow the news coverage of the strike. Pay was not an issue. Wrong answer. No credit.

If you chose b), you were paying attention. News stories did say the miners were striking because Pittston was demanding the contractual right to shift production from union to nonunion mines and was refusing to contribute to multi-employer funds that provide health insurance and pension benefits to retired UMW miners. And the news stories were right—as far as they went.

You didn't choose c) by any chance, did you? If you did, give yourself extra credit for understanding something important about why coal miners still go out on strike in an era when nearly everyone else seems to think that strikes don't work.

Preposterous, you say. How could the average coal miner of today possibly know or care about something that happened in 1914? Anyway, how could a long-forgotten footnote to American history have any bearing on a current economic dispute?

Fair questions. This book* provides some clues.

Thomas N. Bethell is a contributing editor of *The Washington Monthly* and a former research director for the United Mine Workers.

**Where the Sun Never Shines: A History of America's Bloody Coal Industry.* Priscilla Long. *Paragon House, $24.95.*

Where the Sun Never Shines is by no means a first-class work of history. But it's must reading if you want to understand the legacy of mistrust that still haunts the coalfields.

Miner details

Ludlow is indeed little more than a footnote now, a flyspeck on the map of Colorado, down near the New Mexico border. Not many people would want to live in the environs of Ludlow, but throughout the winter of 1913-1914 more than a thousand miners and their families did live there—and lived in tents, because they had been evicted from nearby coal camps. The camps were owned by the Colorado Fuel & Iron Company, which also controlled just about everything else in those parts—the coal, the railroad, the schools, the stores, the sheriffs, and the deputies.

CFI operated a big steel mill at Pueblo, and most of the economic activity of Southern Colorado was dedicated to meeting CFI's needs. CFI in turn was controlled by the Rockefellers; 40-year-old John D. Jr. was becoming known for his philanthropy but was still preoccupied in those days with accumulating as well as dispensing his wealth.

For several years the miners who dug the coal to make the Rockefellers' steel had protested against their conditions of employment, without effect. The company declined to spend money on ventilating fans, so miners choked on coal dust and became incapacitated by pneumoconiosis while still young. They also died in mine fires and explosions. Safety precautions were deliberately ignored.

Miners were not paid for "dead work"—timber-

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ing, drilling, cleaning up—but only for the weight of the coal actually produced, and they were cheated at the company's scales. The cost of tools and blasting powder came out of a miner's pay, and he had to buy his family's food and clothing at the company's store. After all the deductions had been totted up, a miner did well to take home $5 a week. The Rockefellers salted away that much every minute, but if the disparity caused them discomfort they kept it to themselves.

Indeed, when the miners finally balked in September 1913 and demanded changes—including recognition of the UMW as their bargaining agent—the Rockefellers did not respond. Instead they gave their right-hand man on the scene, Lamont Montgomery Bowers, authority to settle things as he saw fit. To Bowers, a hard-boiled New Yorker extravagantly proud of his toughness, that meant refusing to discuss any of the miners' demands. And when they walked out, he had their families evicted from the company's camps.

Bowers confidently told his principals that the strike would be short-lived. He underestimated the strikers—and their wives, who played key roles in organizing and administering the tent colonies, making sure no one froze or starved, walking the picket lines, teaching school, organizing social events, and keeping morale up.

Tents moments

CFI brought in trainloads of strikebreakers and assembled a small army of gun-toting mine guards and company-paid sheriff's deputies to protect them. The guards taunted the strikers and, when they could get them alone or in small groups, beat them up. From the surrounding hillsides, snipers preyed on picketing miners. The miners soon began stockpiling weapons and retaliating in kind, so Bowers bought some machine guns for his guards.

After a series of skirmishes, including one in which three mine guards and a strikebreaker were killed, Governor Elias Ammons called out the Colorado National Guard, ostensibly to restore peace. But many of the guardsmen were mine guards and deputies who merely changed uniforms.

The conflict exploded on the morning of Monday April 20, 1914. Nobody has ever determined who fired the first shot, and it hardly matters anymore. What matters is that shots were exchanged, men on both sides were killed, the Guard commander called in reinforcements, and a day-long battle ensued during which Guardsmen repeatedly fired upon the tents, many of which were still occupied by the miners' families.

Some tents caught fire, and at nightfall, according to the National Guard's own investigative report, "men and soldiers swarmed into the colony and deliberately assisted the conflagration by spreading the fire from tent to tent . . . beyond a doubt it was seen to intentionally that the fire should destroy the whole of the colony." It did. It also killed two women and 11 children, who had been hiding from the gunfire in a pit under one of the tents.

Publicity is a Mother

Fighting continued through the night and for many days thereafter, and the death toll climbed to 46—most of the later deaths were mine guards killed by avenging miners—before President Wilson sent in federal troops on May 1 to restore order.

Up to this point, Ludlow might not seem markedly different from other bloody confrontations between capital and labor that had been erupting periodically ever since the first days of the Industrial Revolution. But Ludlow now brought to the world of industrial conflict a new idea: public relations. Spin control.

Facing a storm of criticism—muckrakers rushing into print, demonstrators marching outside his New York headquarters, Wilson ordering a federal investigation, Congress announcing hearings—Rockefeller called in Ivy Ledbetter Lee, a young man on his way to becoming a legend as the most adroit of the new breed of corporate public relations men. Rockefeller told Lee he felt "much misunderstood." Lee's mission, he said, was to fix that.

The strike leaders never really knew what hit them. Ivy Lee managed to convert an industrial war into a market-research exercise. He identified different "audiences" and targeted propaganda at each: miners' wives (pamphlets about the joys of living in company-built homes and healthy union-free coal camps); the voters of Colorado (advertisements, planted stories, and pamphlets about all the good things CFI had done for the state and all the dreadful things unions were doing elsewhere); and other specific subgroups (e.g., personalized letters to every clergyman in Colorado). He also mailed an assortment of "objective" information to designated opinion leaders nationwide, with the assistance of luminaries such as President Eliot of Harvard (a Rockefeller Foundation trustee)—generally with no indication of the actual source.

Lee covered all the bases. He ghostwrote letters for Governor Ammons to send to President Wilson, and articles for Lamont Montgomery Bowers to send to sympathetic magazines. He made the flinty Bowers sound like a lifelong Rotarian. He created photo

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opportunities for John D. Jr., bringing him to Colorado, dressing him in workman's garb, taking him through a coal mine, and arranging for a miner's child to be dandled on the plutocratic knee while shutters clicked. He even orchestrated a meeting between Rockefeller and Mother Jones, the firebrand union organizer, who emerged to tell reporters that in her newly revised opinion Rockefeller was "a much misunderstood young man."

Ivy Lee's damage control after Ludlow was remarkable, but more important in the long run was his vision of how to keep unions at bay. He urged Rockefeller to adopt a plan that would anticipate and minimally address miners' grievances: "Such provision would not only take the wind out of the union's sails, but would appeal, I am confident, to the soundest public opinion." Bust the unions, in other words, but do it with a smile—using company unions to give workers just enough of a voice to minimize the risk of serious trouble.

Mine wars ever since have been fought not only with bullets but with press releases, and they have been won and lost in the media as well as on the merits. True, the scenery shifts: big draglines strip the western coal now, the company towns are gone, the pay is good, fewer miners die needlessly on the job. But the gap between reality and imagery still exits. Pittston's link to Ludlow may seem tenuous, but it's there if you look. Pittston's chairman, Paul Douglas (son of the late senator from Illinois who ironically was an early champion of the UMW health program), seeking to shave a few bucks off the price of coal in order to accommodate some tough Japanese buyers, turned to the most logical place: labor costs. He could, of course, have set an example by first trimming his own $600,000-per-year-plus-perks salary, but he didn't.

The strike turned bitter, of course, and before it was over Pittston had reportedly spent more than $20 million on security—almost three times its annual payment to the health and retirement funds. The settlement allows Pittston to buy its way out of the funds with a one-time lump-sum payment of $10 million; the company got most of the changes in work rules it had sought.

The UMW fought resourcefully, running expensive newspaper and TV ads and organizing demonstrations on Wall Street and at Pittston's headquarters in Connecticut. But in the end the winner was the ghost of Ivy Lee. □

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POLITICAL PUZZLE

by John Barclay

The numbers indicate the number of letters and words, e.g. (2,3) means a two-letter word followed by a three-letter word. Groups of letters, e.g. USA, are treated as one word.



ACROSS

1. Passed on around six before 500 parted. (7)
5. Seed indifferent country. (7)
9. Jailed early American? (5)
10. Attack chief executive around Ritz with French herein. (9)
11. Entry level art mood developed. (7)
12. Chose to return note to printer about miscellany. (7)
13. Specially incorporated ripple in basic law of science. (9)
15. Hastened around money center to dispose of cash. (5)
17. Refurbished U.S. inn for some Muslims. (5)
19. Used words improperly and quits demo in a huff. (9)
22. Expose Chapel Hill end? (7)
24. Scrambled egg bits are exceptionally large. (7)
25. Race around in and about native ritual. (4,5)
26. Current Kennedy took steps. (5)
27. Aisle is cleared in 5 Across. (7)
28. Reds end design in 5 Across. (7)

DOWN

1. Did pure exercise and helped out after the flood. (5,2)
2. Old-fashioned cantor takes seven on a walk. (9)
3. Energetic 599 accommodate many on the way up. (7)
4. Cut advertisement carefully to save money. (5)
5. Travel costs give Sue edge if managed. (5,4)
6. Reds air broadcast for Pirates. (7)
7. Midwestern state surrounded by communications giant goes off center. (5)
8. Gave up when Ely died in a strange accident. (7)
14. Peoria man straying in 5 Across. (9)
16. Petitioned to boil tea tender. (9)
17. *Times* and *Herald*, for example, out of touch? (7)
18. Comes in to end visa formalities. (7)
20. Jumped rude gap for route to higher status. (7)
21. Excessively favored odd tone harmony. (5,2)
23. Lower temperature of Washington power base under 100. (5)
24. Makeup change around fifty. (5)

Answers to last month's puzzle:



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POLITICAL BOOKNOTES

Public affairs books scheduled to be published this month.

The Medical Triangle. Eli Ginzberg. *Harvard University Press, $27.50.* America's health care system seems to be coming apart at the seams. While inflation has hovered between 3 percent and 4 percent in recent years, medical costs have risen at nearly triple that rate. In 1989, total health care spending exceeded $620 billion, or 11.2 percent of the GNP. Credible projections put this figure at about $1 trillion by 1995, or close to 15 percent of the GNP. That compares to just $13.5 billion, or 4.7 percent of the GNP in 1950, when Dr. Marcus Welby was setting up his practice.

More shocking still is what we're not getting for this money: Half our citizens who live in poverty are not covered by Medicaid. An estimated 37 million Americans, most of them members of working families, have no health insurance. Infant mortality in the United States is higher than in at least a dozen other countries, including Chile, Singapore, and Hong Kong.

Many of Eli Ginzberg's observations in this book of essays are hardly new. Most of this material was previously published in medical journals over the past few years, and like many academics who know their subject well, Ginzberg often lapses into jargon ("modalities of treatment") and seldom attempts to enliven his essays with anecdotes or personal observations. Still, those who hunt will find thought-provoking nuggets that raise issues well suited to further journalistic inquiry. Two chapters, "The Politics of Physician Supply" and "The Reform of Medical Education," are particularly good.

Throughout this century, Ginzberg notes, fierce debates have raged within the medical community about the supply of doctors. The infamous Flexner Report of 1910 is known to students of health care policy as a watershed in the "professionalization" of American medicine. It called for much higher standards, to be accomplished by closing a number of substandard medical schools and reducing the number of doctors. The American Medical Association strongly supported the report, and the effect was dramatic: In 1905, 160 medical schools produced 5,606 graduates; by 1922, there were just 81 schools producing 2,529.

In 1932, the AMA-financed Commission on Medical Education noted that the United States still had more physicians per capita than any other country in the world. In urging further reductions in the number of physicians, the report struck a note that sounds surprisingly contemporary: "The present oversupply of physicians in this country is likely to lead to unnecessary services, to a lowering of the quality of medical care, and to excessive costs because people are not able to judge their needs in such a highly technical field as medicine."

But, as Ginzberg details, these efforts at professional birth control did not prevail. After World War II, a series of prestigious commissions warned of an impending "physician gap." Fueled by massive infusions of federal aid, medical school enrollments soared. Thus, 20 years after World War II, officials of the AMA had converted to the new prevailing orthodoxy: the more physicians, the better our medical care.

But in the seventies, another potential crisis suddenly loomed: a projected "surplus" of physicians. In 1980, the Graduate Medical Education National Advisory Committee issued a report concluding that America would have more than 70,000 physicians by 1990 and almost 150,000 by the end of the century. Indeed, if current trends continue, by the year 2000 the number of physicians per capita will be double the total in 1950.

This is more than just an intriguing numbers game. As Ginzberg suggests, the oversupply of physicians cannot help but affect health care costs. He notes, for example, that between 1970 and 1986, America's physician-to-people ratio increased from 146 to 220 per 100,000. Yet physician income, measured in pretax, constant dollars, stayed virtually the same, because, according to Ginzberg, "in most market areas, as in most fields of specialization, established physicians are able to influence both the demand for their services (by encouraging return visits by their patients) and their incomes (by raising their fees)."

Physicians doubtless will respond that this is a gross oversimplification, and there's truth to that. In fairness, there are other factors at work. For example, the fear of malpractice lawsuits has also encouraged the "Call me if you don't feel better" style of practice to give way to the "Come back next week for a check up" approach.

In "The Reform of Medical Education," Ginzberg challenges another orthodoxy: the training of physicians. Notwithstanding the increasing complexity of modern medicine, Ginzberg believes that medical students today spend *too much* time in academic training. Most of them, he notes, spend three years in medical school, and then at least two more in specialized medical education.

Ginzberg makes a strong case for eliminating a full year of training. At the heart of his argument is his observation that despite a 1:1 faculty-to-student ratio at most medical schools, faculty more and more engage in private practices that provide them and the medical schools with income—but do little to enhance the education of medical students, who therefore get less hands-on instruction in basic practice. The result is increasing specialization. And in general, the longer medical students stay in school, the more debt they incur. This in turn intensifies the trend towards lucrative —and over-subscribed—specialties.

There is one major point in

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Ginzberg's essays that I strongly dispute. Sophisticated—and increasingly expensive—medical technology is raising difficult questions about who should and shouldn't get medical care. But Ginzberg doesn't believe the public wants difficult choices to be made. He predicts that medical care could consume 15 or even 20 percent of our GNP before public officials confront these dilemmas.

Should we spend $200,000 of our Medicaid funds for a liver transplant with a 20 percent chance of success or invest the same amount of money in prenatal care for 2,000 infants? Like Ginzberg, all of us would rather do both, but too often that's difficult. It's not a question of whether we ration care—we already do that, in subtle, behind-the-scenes ways—but on what basis we should make those decisions.

My own experience suggests these difficult questions are already hard upon us. The Oregon legislature—of which I'm a member—approved a law last year that will probably have the effect of denying certain marginally effective procedures to some Medicaid patients in return for extending scarce Medicaid dollars to 77,000 citizens who now have no health insurance at all. We didn't do this out of indifference to human life but as an acknowledgement of the cruel reality that resources for health care are truly limited.

—Phil Keisling

Behind the Factory Walls: Decision Making in Soviet and U.S. Enterprises. Paul R. Lawrence, Charalambos A. Vlachoutsicos. *Harvard Business School Press. $29.95.* Until recently, secrecy was the operating norm of the Soviet economy. With Westerners barred from the country's interior as security risks, little was known of the giant factory complexes that stamped out Russia's machinery, trucks, and cars, save for official propaganda out of Moscow. Yet another result of glasnost is this book, the first close-up observation of heartland Soviet industry by U. S. experts, with important lessons for America's own managers.

Beginning in 1988, members of the Harvard Business School conducted in-depth examinations of four Russian factories. They looked at two truck engine and two electrical equipment factories in the Ukraine and Great Russia. Working with Soviet scholars, the team talked to employees throughout the organizations, attended factory meetings, and examined relevant documents. They then studied four comparable plants in this country.

Their findings go beyond the current round of self-congratulation about the superiority of U.S. capitalism. On one hand, it will come as no surprise that the Harvard team found the Soviet factory older and more unwieldy than its American counterpart. Such standard management tools as inventory control, cost accounting, and marketing were in primitive stages of development. But contrary to common perceptions, especially in the western press, the Harvard team found that perestroika has made a positive impact on factory management. By and large, Soviet managers are discarding bad bureaucratic habits —establishing direct ties with customers, for example, and paying more attention to the design and delivery of products.

The heart of the book concerns the effects of perestroika on the workers. To an extent that astonished the authors, great strides had been made in engaging the workforce in self-management and shop-floor democracy. In the four factories, newly elected workers councils and team leaders were not only in place, but were emerging as effective players in decision making. At one job site, several hundred workers were observed engaging in a "self-critical" production plan. This was not the political harangue one might expect, but an open forum by the rank and file to reduce bottlenecks in the manufacture of electrical motors. Elsewhere, a workers' council blocked an attempt by the local party functionary to fire a supervisor—a situation unthinkable a few years ago.

The Harvard people use a lot of fancy terminology to describe what comes down to this: Under perestroika Soviet managers tell employee groups what to do, but not *how* to do it. Management meets on a daily basis with group leaders and takes pains to build a consensus rather than hand down orders. Workers become involved in the process by deciding how to achieve the desired result. Work groups reduce overhead costs by assuming responsibility for scheduling, machine maintenance, even at times training and discipline within the group.

Sound familiar? In America the same goals of teamwork and cooperation are constantly espoused, but with less satisfactory results. "Quality circles" and "gain sharing"—two in-vogue management concepts—tend to be add-ons, not integral parts, of the traditional American chain-of-command structure. Here, bosses still run the shops through instructions passed down the command ladder. Hourly employees have only limited say outside their prescribed duties. The major difference is that human relations people now come by for upbeat talks and occasional "round circle" meetings. By decentralizing power through the hierarchy, the Soviets have managed to enhance labor productivity in otherwise rickety factories. In this age of dying ideologies and heightened global competition, that's an accomplishment that deserves notice.

—Mark Reutter

The Growth Experiment: How the New Tax Policy Is Transforming the U.S. Economy. Lawrence B. Lindsey. *Basic Books, $21.95.* Lawrence Lindsey has actually written two books under one cover. Part I is a detailed apology for Reagan's 1981 tax cuts—the Economic Recovery Tax Act, or ERTA. This "Great Experiment," according to Lindsey, throttled inflation, restored an eroding tax base, increased business investment, barely affected the federal deficit, and led to the current economic boom. He sacrifices consideration of everything—from interest rates to global economic factors to plain old common sense—in pursuit of the proof that low tax rates are the single most important element of economic efficiency. Somehow, Lindsey manages to restrain himself from exploring the beneficial effect lower taxes had on the common cold.

More problematic is Lindsey's failure to acknowledge that real incomes have fallen since 1973, or that American productivity (a better indicator of economic health than GNP, since it measures technological innovation) is growing at only about 1 per-

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cent per year—much more slowly than in either Japan or West Germany. His attempt to discount the prevailing view that the economic expansion has been heavily leveraged depends on the selective use of statistics. Although he points out that the ratio of corporate debt to liquid assets has been fairly constant throughout the 1980s, he omits a more compelling statistic: The ratio of corporate interest payments to cash flow rose 43 percent between 1976 and 1986, from 14 percent to 20 percent.

But *The Growth Experiment* isn't all nonsense. Lindsey is persuasive in arguing that high rates do induce taxpayers to avoid paying taxes. If his analysis proves anything, however, it's mostly that tax shelters and loopholes are as culpable as high tax rates. The supposition that high rates erode the tax base depends on the willingness of individuals to forgo income rather than pay taxes on their extra effort. This depends in large measure on what tax shelters are available, because not working is always less attractive than shifting income into a capital gains shelter or taking compensation in the form of untaxed fringe benefits. Hence, eliminating shelters and taxing fringe benefits are equally viable alternatives to cutting taxes for the rich.

The second book, tucked away near the end, reveals a different Lindsey altogether. This economist has something approaching a social conscience (always refreshing to discover in a Bush administration apparatchik) and several ideas that don't fit the doctrinaire supply-side mold. Although his goal is to "apply the lessons" of ERTA while designing the tax system of the future, Lindsey manages to thoughtfully critique many of the most unfair aspects of the existing tax code.

Two of the decent reforms Lindsey would make are closing the loophole that allows capital gains at death to escape taxation and capping the mortgage interest deduction so that mansions are no longer subsidized by the government. He would also tax corporations on their cash flows (revenue minus production expenses and reinvestment), a move that would not only simplify a needlessly complicated section of the tax code but would also eliminate the tax-based bias in favor of debt financing over equity. Finally, he would increase the deduction for charitable giving, with a double deduction for contributions of more than 5 percent of income.

Lindsey ends up recommending that old Republican standby, the flat tax. But after a decade in which the richest fifth of the population saw its share of national income increase much faster than its share of the tax burden, economic disparity isn't a question that should be swept under the rug. Lindsey and his supply-side friends never ask themselves how much economic disparity is really necessary, and never show why the income tax shouldn't be the mechanism to mitigate—not eliminate—economic inequality.

—David P. Hamilton

The Genocidal Mentality: Nazi Holocaust and Nuclear Threat. Robert Jay Lifton, Eric Markusen. *Basic Books, $22.95.* Though this book rests on a questionable premise —that there is a common explanation for why some people could murder tens of millions during World War II and why other people can build and plan for nuclear wars—it nonetheless raises painful and disturbing questions and tries to explain how men and

Media Messages from Oxford



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



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women can live normal lives while pursuing evil goals.

Robert Jay Lifton, distinguished professor of psychiatry and psychology at John Jay College and the City University of New York, and Eric Markusen, a sociologist teaching at Carthage College in Wisconsin, believe that, paradoxically, those who participate in the actual or potential killing of so many people can still love their wives and kids, sleep peacefully, and eschew any moral doubts.

Certainly many of our contemporary nuclear gang live quite comfortably, thank you. Academicians, neoconservatives, "defense intellectuals" and "strategists"—most of whom have never served on active military duty—pour out a stream of publications about "nuclear survivability," about "being ready to fight a nuclear war if necessary," and other tough game plans. Moreover, the subject is sexy and rewarding, often transforming these desk warriors into celebrities, while the existence of a vast technological capacity and commitment to the weapons *invites* and helps sustain the "genocidal mentality."

There is a paradox here. An SDI scientist can sincerely deny he is working on a "weapon of death," and workers at nuclear plants can reject as nonsense any suggestion that they are doing anything wicked, as A.G. Mojtabai pointed out in her brilliant if largely overlooked book *Blessed Assurance*, which deals with Bible-belt Amarillo, Texas, home of the final assembly plant for American nuclear weapons.

All the same, the comparison with the Nazi murderers is spurious, to say the least. The men who planned and executed the Holocaust were—together with the mass killer, Stalin—quite unlike the "crazy analysts" who dream and scheme about first-strike scenarios and battlefield victories. That they both require the collaboration of doctors, psychiatrists, engineers, physicists, social scientists, businessmen and political ideologists, as the authors argue, is no doubt true. But to insist that "troubling parallels" between the two establishes the connection is murky stuff indeed. The German physicians whom Lifton once interviewed and wrote about committed awful crimes; the "crimes" the lunatics and Strangeloves among us may one day commit haven't happened yet, though Lifton and Markusen believe—perhaps correctly, who knows?—that our nuclear weapons system "creates a threshold waiting to be crossed."

Even so, the authors are on to something. Like Germans who followed Hitler—perhaps like any people living in confusing times—post-World War II Americans seem to have needed an enemy to remain sane. When, for example, onetime Pentagon research director Herbert York concluded in 1960 that the Soviets were complying with the nuclear test moratorium, the venerable war hawk John McCone, then head of the Atomic Energy Commission, warned, "saying that was tantamount to treason."

Yet there were important people in Washington who grew to understand the risks entailed in ever using the weapons, men like Robert McNamara and Henry Kissinger. Both, write the authors, were victims of what they describe as psychic numbing, disavowal, and denial because the alternatives to mass destruction were either unachievable or unimaginable. McNamara, they write, was an early backer of "finite deterrence" but slowly shifted his views after learning what the think-tank people and their allies were really saying.

Henry Kissinger had some of the same concerns. An early supporter of cautious deterrence, he became increasingly bellicose after moving into Nixon's White House, going so far as to draft a memo in 1972 about "strategic sufficiency" and how it could "ensure the U.S. would emerge from a nuclear war in discernibly better shape than the Soviet Union." But after hanging around the war games theorists he finally uttered his now-famous complaint: "What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it politically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?"

—*Murray Polner*

Flashbacks: On Returning to Vietnam. Morley Safer. *Random House, $18.95.* There are those who genuinely believe that Morley Safer, all by himself, lost the Vietnam war.

"A story so dramatic that it sometimes tells itself."

—The New York Times Book Review



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One of the persistent myths of that conflict is that television, by bringing the horrors of war into American living rooms, fatally undermined American public support for the war. The example most cited is Safer's emotionally wrenching August 1965 coverage of a U.S. Marine company putting the torch to Cam Ne hamlet while women screamed and cried in the foreground and their wailing children clung to their skirts in terror.

"The Cam Ne story was broadcast over and over again in the United States and overseas," Safer remarks in *Flashbacks*, his retrospective on his time as a Vietnam war correspondent and account of his 1989 visit there to make a CBS documentary. "It was seized upon by Hanoi as a propaganda tool and by scoundrels of the left and right . . . . To the Peace Movement it was The Revealed Truth . . . . To the war movement it was blatant evidence of the perfidy of journalism." Of course it was neither.

Intentional American cruelty toward the Vietnamese was far outweighed by the thousands upon thousands of acts of help and generosity resulting in a reservoir of good will toward Americans (as Safer discovered) that continues until this day. And vivid combat television coverage of "the horrors of war" was also a rarity. As *Battle Lines*, a 1985 Twentieth Century Fund report on military-media relations found, from August 1965 to August 1970, only about 3 percent (76 stories out of 2,300) of all the evening network news film reports from Vietnam showed heavy fighting, with dead and wounded displayed on the screen.

Morley Safer did not lose the Vietnam war. Neither did television, although there are those like George Will and William Westmoreland who would have it otherwise. Television is without parallel in showing the cost of war. But the cost of war, as with the cost of anything, has meaning only in relation to value. It is the objective of the war, Carl von Clausewitz wrote in 1832, that determines its value, and it is that value that determines the sacrifices to be made for it both in magnitude and duration.

For Americans the objective of the Vietnam war, and hence its value, was never made clear. That was true even on the battlefield. "Almost 70 percent of Army generals who managed the war," reported Brigadier General Douglas Kinnard, later chief of the Army's Center of Military History, "were uncertain of its objectives." No wonder the American people eventually judged the cost to be exorbitant.

But for the Vietnamese communists it was a different story, as Safer found during his return visit to Vietnam. "Your soldiers fought very well," said North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap (whose reputation, Safer notes, was based "on the bones of perhaps two million of 'the sacrificed' "), "but they did not know why they were here . . . ours were martyrs to a cause."

Safer got the same story from retired Colonel Bui Tin of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). In one of the many contradictions he encountered, Safer was surprised to learn that Tin, a 37-year NVA veteran, has a sister living in Los Angeles. Not only that, but Colonel Tin had visited the Vietnam Memorial in Washington. "You must remember the kind of bravery those young men had," Colonel Tin told Safer. "They may not have had much understanding of the aims of that war. But the sacrifice, so much sacrifice, must not be forgotten."

Asked if it was hard to keep his own men motivated during their incredible hardships moving supplies down the Ho Chi Minh trail, Colonel Tin replied, "It was not hard because our men had an idea, a cause."

But was the cause worth it? This was the question Safer posed to Dr. Duong Quynh Hoa, one of the 16 founders of the National Liberation Front, the Vietcong. Dr. Hoa left the communist party in 1979, "thoroughly disillusioned with what she called the second-rate people who had taken over."

"I thought I was making a revolution for the people," she said. "I discovered that I made a revolution for a cause, for a discipline, for an ideology. The people had nothing to do with it."

Such disillusionment was mirrored in Safer's conversation with Pham Xuan An, an erstwhile correspondent for Reuters and for *Time* magazine in Saigon who turned out to be a Viet Cong colonel who had been working for the communists since 1944. "By 1975 I had few hopes left that the revolution would be anything but the disaster it has turned into," he told Safer.

"Why did your revolution fail so miserably?" Safer asked. An replied, "They called it a *people's* revolution. But of course the *people* were the first to suffer; the *people* were immediately forgotten. They still haven't remembered the *people*."

Asked if he had any regrets, however, An said "No. No regrets. I had to do it. This peace that I fought for may be crippling this country, but the war was killing it . . . . The Americans had to be driven out of Vietnam one way or another. We must sort this place out ourselves."

Safer has a way of illuminating the truth, even to a degree that he himself does not understand. His 1965 coverage of the burning of Cam Ne, for example, hit on the truth that American military forces were in a no-win situation when it came to subduing the internal Viet Cong insurrection. Their cruelties, as at Cam Ne, inflamed the passions of the American people; and their kindnesses undermined the very purpose they were in Vietnam to achieve.

Strengthening the Saigon government was supposedly the primary reason we were in Vietnam. But to the degree that Americans won the "hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese people, they further alienated them from that very government. Yet another contradiction "in a society that had made contradiction its one unshakable precept."

And during his 1989 return, Safer again hit on the truth. The revolution had failed. As Pham Xuan An, the former Viet Cong colonel, told him, "All that talk of 'liberation,' 20, 30, 40 years ago, all the plotting, and all the bodies, produced this, this impoverished, broken-down country led by a gang of cruel and paternalistic half-educated theorists."

How sad. Yet in Dr. Hoa's and Colonel An's words, and especially their emphasis on the "people," there is hope. In 1990, "All power to the People" has taken on new meaning. People brought down the communist tyranny in East Europe. And people will eventually bring it down in East Asia as well.

—*Col. Harry G. Summers Jr.*

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Mary Brodie won't feel the lump in her breast for another two years.



Like a lot of women, Mary Brodie understands the importance of regular breast self-examination. And because she's never felt a lump, she thinks everything is fine. It's the same conclusion a lot of women reach.

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